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Judicial Disqualification and Recusal in Criminal Cases
Abstract. The United States Supreme Court has recognized circumstances
in which the probability of judicial bias requiring disqualification or recusal is
"too high to be constitutionally tolerable." At the same time, the Texas
Constitution contains a number of provisions barring a judge from presiding
over a case under specific circumstances, while statutes and procedural rules
either disqualify a judge or require him or her to be recused. Thus, whether a
particular judge may preside over a given criminal case may be questioned
under the Due Process Clause, the Texas Constitution, statue, or the rules of
procedure. This Article will examine the applicable constitutional, statutory,
and procedural rules that determine whether a particular judge may preside
over a specific criminal case in Texas.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the United States Supreme Court has observed, "[i]t is axiomatic that
'a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process."
Nevertheless, the Court opined, matters of judicial disqualification were
best left to statutes and judicial codes, and for almost a century, were not
considered to rise to the constitutional level.2 By the early twentieth
century, however, the Court began to recognize circumstances in which
the probability of judicial bias was "too high to be constitutionally
tolerable."' At the same time, the Texas Constitution contains a number
of provisions barring a judge from presiding over a case under specific
circumstances, while statutes and procedural rules either disqualify a judge
or require him or her to be recused. Thus, whether a particular judge may
preside over a given case may be questioned under due process, the Texas
Constitution, the rules of procedure, or statue. This Article will examine
the applicable constitutional, statutory, and procedural rules that determine
whether a particular judge may preside over a specific criminal case in
Texas.
Judges in criminal cases are subject to both disqualification and recusal.4
A judge may be disqualified under due process, provisions of the Texas
Constitution, Article 30.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or
Rule 18b of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.' She may also be subject
1. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 867 (2009) (quoting In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
2. Id. (quoting FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948)).
3. Id. at 877 (quoting Winthrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
4. See TEX. CONST. art. V, S 11 (explaining when a judge may be disqualified in both the higher
and lower courts); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 30.01 (West 2006) (providing the causes for
which a judge can be disqualified); TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b (laying out the grounds for disqualification
and recusal of judges); Gaal v. State, 332 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ("A Texas judge
may be removed from presiding over a case for one of three reasons: he is constitutionally
disqualified; he is subject to a statutory strike; or, he is subject to statutory disqualification or recusal
under the Texas Supreme Court rules." (footnotes omitted)); Rhodes v. State, 357 S.W.3d 796, 799
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) ("A Texas judge may be removed from a case if he
or she is (1) constitutionally disqualified, (2) subject to a statutory strike, (3) subject to statutory
disqualification, or (4) subject to recusal under rules promulgated by the Texas Supreme Court."); see
also Arnold v. State, 853 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (affirming the civil rules of recusal
"appl[y] to criminal cases absent 'any explicit or implicit legislative intent indicating otherwise"'
(quoting McClenan v. State, 661 S.W.2d 108, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983))). The rule permitting a
party to strike a visiting judge specifically applies only in civil cases. See TEx. Gov CODE ANN.
§ 74.053 (West 2005) ("If a party in a civil case files a timely objection to the assignment, the judge
shall not hear the case.").
5. TEX. CONST. art. V, S 11; CRIM. PROC. art. 30.01; TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(a); see Caperton, 556
U.S. at 884-87 (concluding raising funds for a judge's election by a party's president created a
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to recusal under Rule 18b of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.6  The
difference between the disqualification and the recusal are significant:
while recusal is subject to the procedures and time limits set out in
Rules 18a and 18b of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may raise
the issue of disqualification at any time during trial or on direct appeal;'
the parties cannot waive a judge's disqualification;8 and the acts of a
disqualified judge are voidable.9
situation requiring recusal under the Due Process Clause); see also Arnold, 853 S.W.2d at 544 (applying
the civil rules of recusal to criminal cases in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary).
6. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(b).
7. Id. R. 18a(a), (b)(2), (g)(3)(B). Traditionally, disqualification could be raised for the First time
on appeal. See Whitehead v. State, 273 S.W.3d 285, 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (reiterating a
defendant may raise issue of disqualification for first time on appeal); Ex parte Richardson,
201 S.W.3d 712, 714 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006, orig. proceeding) (asserting a defendant may raise the
issue of disqualification during trial or direct appeal, but the issue is not cognizable on habeas); see also
Lackey v. State, 364 S.W.3d 837, 846-47 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (holding a defendant made a timely
preserved objection that the judge who presided over his pretrial motion to suppress was disqualified
by filing a motion to set aside the suppression ruling as soon as discovering the suppression judge
lacked statutory qualifications to serve as a visiting judge). Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a()(2) ("An
order granting or denying a motion to recuse may be reviewed by mandamus and may be appealed in
accordance with other law'), aith id. R. 18a(j)(1)(A)-(B) (proclaiming an order denying a recusal
motion may be appealed only on final judgment and an order granting recusal may not be appealed).
Recent changes to Rule 18a, particularly the requirement that a motion to disqualify must be filed "as
soon as practicable," suggest disqualification need not be raised in the trial court to be preserved,
though other portions of the rule are ambiguous. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(b)(2) (providing the
requirements for the time in which a motion to disqualify must be filed), with id. R. 18a(j)(2) ("An
order granting or denying a motion to disqualify may be reviewed by mandamus and may be appealed
in accordance with other law."). In prior cases, five judges on the Court of Criminal Appeals, in
dicta, have suggested a defendant must assert a judge is disqualified at trial or risk waiving the issue,
albeit under different theories. Compare Whitehead, 273 S.W.3d at 290 (Johnson, J., concurring)
("[Tihe authority of a judge to act, as opposed to the jurisdiction of the court, is not a jurisdictional
question and must therefore be raised in court; it may not be raised for the first time on appeal."),
with id. at 290-91 (Keller, P.J., dissenting) (recommending the timeliness of an objection to a judge's
authority to preside over a case should be controlled by Rule 33.1).
8. See Gamez v. State, 737 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) ("The disqualification of a
judge may not be waived even by the consent of parties." (citation omitted)); see also Abram v. State,
20 S.W. 987, 988 (Tex. Crim. App. 1893) (holding a judge who had represented the defendant in the
case before taking the bench was disqualified from the same case, notwithstanding the fact the
defendant suggested appointment of the judge, and both parties agreed to appointment). But see Ex
parte Richardson, 201 S.W.3d at 714 (concluding a defendant who pled true to revocation before a
judge he knew had been the prosecutor in the original prosecution could not raise issue of
disqualification on collateral attack).
9. See Lackey, 364 S.W.3d at 846-47 (asserting the ruling by a visiting judge who was
disqualified to preside as a visiting judge was a nullity); Greer v. State, 999 S.W.2d 484, 487-88 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. refd) (declaring the condition of probation was void where it
had been added by the judge who was disqualified from presiding over the case). Compare Whitehead,
273 S.W.3d at 289 (deciding a retaliation conviction was a "nullity" where a judge was disqualified on
the basis that he was one of the individuals the defendant had threatened), with Exparte Richardson,
201 S.W.3d at 714 (holding, though the judge was disqualified to try the case, since the rulings were
79
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II. DISQUALIFICATION
There are three principal provisions under which a trial judge may be
disqualified in a criminal case, though there is significant overlap between
them. A trial judge may be disqualified under either Article V, section 11
of the Texas Constitution;'o Article 30.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure;" or Rule 18b(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.'2 Article V,
Section 11 provides:
No judge shall sit in any case wherein the judge may be interested, or where
either of the parties may be connected with the judge, either by affinity or
consanguinity, within such a degree as may be prescribed by law, or when
the judge shall have been counsel in the case.13
Article 30.01 declares:
No judge or justice of the peace shall sit in any case where he may be the
party injured, or where he has been counsel for the State or the accused, or
where the accused or the party injured may be connected with him by
consanguinity or affinity within the third degree, as determined under
Chapter 573, Government Code.'4
Finally, Rule 18b(a) requires a judge to disqualify himself if: (1) "the
judge has served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with
whom the judge previously practiced law served" as counsel in the case;
(2) he "knows that, individually or as a fiduciary, [he] has an interest in the
subject matter of the controversy;" or (3) any "of the parties may be
related to them by affinity or consanguinity within the third degree.""
In addition to the three primary provisions for disqualification, common
law provides that a judge may be disqualified from presiding over a case in
which he has developed a bias so extreme as to violate a party's due
process rights." There are also a number of statutory provisions that
voidable, not void, the issue was not cognizable on habeas).
10. See Exparte Richardson, 201 S.W.3d at 712-13 (concluding a judge may be disqualified under
Article V, Section 11).
11. See Whitehead, 273 S.W.3d at 287-88 (holding a judge may disqualified under Article 30.01);
id. (finding a judge may be disqualified under Article 30.01 or Article V, Section 11).
12. See Kennedy v. Wortham, 314 S.W.3d 34, 36 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2010, pet. denied)
(applying Rule 18b(1) but finding the judge was not disqualified); see also TEX. R. App. P. 16.1 ("The
grounds for disqualification of appellate court justice or judge are determined by the Constitution and
the laws of Texas."); Arnold v. State, 853 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (holding Rule 18a
applies in criminal cases).
13. TEx. CONST. art. V, § 11.
14. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 30.01 (West 2006).
15. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(1)(a)-(c).
16. See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1997) ("Mhe floor established by the Due
80
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prohibit a judge from participating in a case under specific administrative
circumstances."
Grounds for disqualification, thus, generally fall into the following
broad categories: (a) the judge has an interest in the case; (b) the judge is,
or is related to, a party in the case; (c) the judge actively participated as
counsel for either party in the case; (d) the judge possesses such an
extreme bias against the defendant as to violate due process; and (e) other
miscellaneous grounds.1 8
Disqualification of appellate court justices and judges is narrower.
Disqualification in an appellate court is governed by Rule 16.1 of the Rules
of Appellate Procedure, which provides that "the grounds for
disqualification of an appellate court justice or judge are determined by the
constitution and laws of Texas."1" Since the rule limits disqualification to
constitutional and statutory grounds only, an appellate justice or judge
cannot be disqualified solely on a ground set out in Rule 18b(a).20
A. The judge Has an Interest in the Case
Article V, Section 11 of the Texas constitution provides that "no judge
shall sit in any case wherein he or she may be interested."21 Ukewise,
Process Clause clearly requires a 'fair trial in a fair tribunal' . . . before a judge with no actual bias
against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case." (quoting Withrow v. Larkin,
421 U.S. 35,46 (1975))); McClenan v. State, 661 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) ("[W]e limit
the use of bias as a ground for disqualification to those cases in which the bias is shown to be of such
a nature and to such an extent as to deny a defendant due process of law."); see also Celis v. State,
354 S.W.3d 7, 21 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 2011) ("The Due Process Clause guarantees a
defendant a fair trial in a fair tribunal before a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or
interest in the outcome of his particular case." (citing Bray, 520 U.S. at 904-05)), affd on other grounds,
416 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
17. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)-(b) (2012) (stating the circumstances in which a judge shall
disqualify himself).
18. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2(b) (laying out the qualifications for a Texas Supreme Court
justice); id art. V, § 4(a) (providing the qualifications for a Texas Court of Criminal Appeals judge); id.
art. V, § 7 (stating the qualifications for a district court judge); id. art. XVI, § 1 (establishing the
requirement of an anti-bribery oath); id. art. XVI, § 5 (indicating disqualification results from offering
or accepting a bribe).
19. TEX. R. App. P. 16.1.
20. See F.S. New Prods., Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc., 129 S.W.3d 594, 598-601 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd) (holding vicarious disqualification under [Rule 18b(a)(1)] does
not apply to an appellate court justice where vicarious disqualification has never been applied under
the Constitution and statute); Sears v. Olivarez, 28 S.W.3d 611, 615 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2000, no pet.) (en banc) ("The grounds for disqualification of appellate court justices are determined
by the [qonstitution and the laws of Texas." (citation omitted)); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 16 Notes and
Comments ("For grounds for disqualification, reference is made to the Constitution and statutes
rather than the Rules of Civil Procedure.").
21. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11. Similarly, the Supreme Court has opined that due process
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under Rule 18b(a)(2) "a judge must disqualify in any proceeding" if "the
judge knows that, individually or as a fiduciary, [he] has an interest in the
subject matter in controversy."22 The Constitution does not define what
constitutes an "interest" in a case. Violating the maxim of logic that
nothing should be defined in terms of itself," the Texas Supreme Court
has limited an "interest that disqualifies a judge" to an interest, "however
small, which rests on a direct pecuniary or personal interest in the result of
the case."" Similarly, Rule 18b defines "financial interest" as "ownership
of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director,
adviser, or other active participant in the affairs of a party."2 5
Though simply being named in a suit is not a sufficient "interest" to
disqualify a judge from presiding over a criminal proceeding," it does not
follow that not being named will automatically insulate a judge from a
disqualifying interest if the judge's rulings might influence an ancillary case
in which the judge is a party." A judge's personal view on an issue before
her, however, does not constitute an "interest in the subject matter of the
controversy"2  sufficient to warrant her disqualification.2
requires that a judge who has "a direct, personal, substantial, [or] pecuniary interest" in a case be
disqualified. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
22. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18b(a)(2).
23. See IRVING M. COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION To LOGIC 125-27 (11th ed. 2002)
(defining something in terms of itself makes it too vague for purposes of logical analysis).
24. Cameron v. Greenhill, 582 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Tex. 1979) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
Finding the justices of the Supreme Court had no greater pecuniary interest in suit over state bar fees
than any other member of the bar and were not disqualified simply because they had been named in
the suit. Id.
25. TEx. R. Civ. P. 18b(d)(4).
26. See Chamberlain v. State, 453 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) ("If the mere filing
of a civil action against the judge presiding [over a] .. . case would disqualify [the judge], then any
judge would be subject to disqualification at the whim [of either party]."); see also Cameron, 582 S.W.2d
at 776 (finding that being named in the suit was not sufficient to disqualify a judge as having an
"interest" in the case, particularly where the judge enjoys judicial immunity over subject of suit);
Kennedy v. Staples, 336 S.W.3d 745, 750 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2011, no pet.) (asserting a party
seeking nominal damages against a judge was not sufficient to disqualify the judge as having an
interest in the controversy); Kennedy v. Wortham, 314 S.W.3d 34, 36 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2010,
no pet.) (declaring merely being named in a suit was not sufficient to disqualify a judge); Prince v.
State, 677 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1984, no pet.) (holding a judge was not
disqualified from an attempted capital murder case on the basis the defendant had filed a civil suit
against him).
27. See Aetna Life Ins. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824 (1986) (finding an appellate judge, who was
not named in an insurance suit, nevertheless had an "interest" in the case as it set precedent for the
claim and thereby "enhanc[ed] both the legal status and the settlement value of his own case,"
requiring disqualification under due process).
28. TEx. R. CIv. P. 18b(a)(2).
29. See Chastain v. State, 667 S.W.2d 791, 796 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, pet.
refd) (contending the judge's personal opinion of the death penalty was not a ground for
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B. The Judge Is, or Is Related to, a Pary in the Case
Article V, section 11 of the Texas Constitution mandates that a judge is
disqualified from any case "where either of the parties may be connected
with the judge, either by affinity or consanguinity, within such a degree as
may be prescribed by law."3 o Article 30.01 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure delimits the degree of affinity or consanguinity: "No judge ...
shall sit in any case where he may be the party injured, or. . . where the
accused or the party injured may be connected with him by consanguinity
within the third degree."3 ' Rule 18b(a)(3) of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure echoes Article 30.01 by providing that judges are disqualified
when "either of the parties may be related to the judge by affinity or
consanguinity within the third degree."3
Since the State is always one of the parties in a criminal prosecution and
an individual person cannot be related to the State by ties of affinity or
consanguinity," a plain reading the Texas Constitution and Rule 18b
suggests both only prohibit a judge from presiding over a case in which he
is related to the accused. The Code of Criminal Procedure, going further,
disqualifies a judge from presiding over a case in which she is related to the
accused, she is the victim herself, or she is related to the victim."
None of the rules prohibit a judge from presiding over a case in which
she is related to counsel in the case.3 ' Thus, a judge may not be
disqualified in a case in which she is related to one of the attorneys before
disqualification); Templin v. State, 321 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tex. Crim. App. 1959) (holding the judge's
mere expression of disapproval of alcohol use and sale was not grounds for disqualification, absent
showing that prejudice was sufficient to disqualify judge); see also McKenna v. State, 221 S.W.3d 765,
768 (Tex. App.-Waco 2007, no pet.) (claiming the judge had no "interest" in a bail bond forfeiture
case simply due to the fact he served on the bail bond board).
30. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11.
31. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 30.01 (West 2006).
32. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18b(a)(3).
33. See Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 256 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) ("In a criminal case, the
only parties are the State and the defendant. It is not possible to have ties of blood or marriage to
'the State."'.
34. CRIM. PROC. art. 30.01; see also id. (finding "Article 30.01's 'parties injured' language appears
to be intended to include the victim (complainant), and we so hold;" thus, the fact the judge was the
uncle of the officer who was a "complaining witness" in a capital murder case did not disqualify him
from presiding).
35. See Martinez v. Martinez, 608 S.W.2d 719, 720 (Tex. 1980) (reaffirming a lawyer is not a
party to a suit within the meaning of Article V, Section 11 or the precursor to Rule 18b); McKnight
v. State, 432 S.W.2d 69, 71-72 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (concluding the district attorney is not a
"party" to a criminal case within the meaning of Article V, Section 11 or Article 30.01); Winston v.
Masterson, 27 S.W. 768, 768 (Tex. 1894) (deciding a lawyer is not a "party" in a suit under Article V,
Section 11).
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her, though she may be subject to recusal.16  Under Texas anti-nepotism
statutes, however, a judge may not appoint a relative within the applicable
degrees of consanguinity or affinity as counsel for an indigent defendant
who will be paid from public funds.3
1. The Judge Is the Victim
Oddly, perhaps, neither the Texas Constitution nor the Rules of Civil
Procedure specifically prohibit a judge from presiding over a case in which
he is the victim, as the prohibition against sitting on a case in which the
judge has an "interest" has been construed narrowly and both provisions
bar a judge only if he is "connected" or "related" to a "party. "38
Article 30.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, however, disqualifies a
judge "where he may be the party injured."" Though rare, judges have on
occasion been disqualified under this provision.40 Disqualification on the
36. See McKnight, 432 S.W.2d at 71-72 (finding a judge was not disqualified from a case his son-
in-law prosecuted); see also Martinez, 608 S.W.2d at 720 (affirming the judge was not disqualified from
a case in which his son-in-law represented one of the parties); Winston, 27 S.W. at 768 (holding a
judge was not disqualified from a case in which his brother represented one of the parties); Kimmell
v. Leoffler, 791 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ) (per curiam) (finding
membership in the same branch of government or same professional organization does not amount
to a relationship by affinity or consanguinity); Lyon v. State, 764 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1988) (holding the judge was not disqualified from presiding over a case his son prosecuted), afd,
872 S.W.2d 732 (rex. Crim. App. 1994).
37. See Bean v. State, 691 S.W.2d 773, 774-75 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, pet. refd) (affirming
the judge's guilty verdict for official misconduct in violating the nepotism statute by appointing his
uncle to represent indigent defendants in his court); see also TEX. GOv'T CODE ANN. § 573.041(1)
(West 2004) ("A public official may not appoint ... an individual to a position that is directly or
indirectly compensated from public funds or fees if ... the individual is related to the public official
within a degree described by Section 573.002 . .. .'; Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. LA-111 (1975)
(opining the nepotism law prohibits a district court judge from appointing a relative to represent
indigent defendants); William Wayne Kilgarlin & Jennifer Bruch, Disquafication and Recusal ofJudges,
17 ST. MARY'S L. J. 599, 609-10 (1986) ("But, a judge should nevertheless beware of appointing a
relative to represent an indigent. Article 5996a of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, the anti-nepotism
statute, has been interpreted in Attorney General Opinion LA No. 111, as prohibiting the
appointment of a relative as attorney for an indigent when public funds are used to pay the
attorney.").
38. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11 ("No judge shall sit in any case wherein the judge may be
interested, or where either of the parties may be connected with the judge . . . ."); TEX. R. CIV.
P. 18b(a)(2) (disqualifying a judge when she "knows that, individually or as a fiduciary, [she] has an
interest in the subject matter of the controversy; or either of the parties may be related to the judge");
Davis v. State, 44 Tex. 523, 524 (1876) ("The fact that the presiding judge was the person from
whom the property was alleged to be stolen ... is not a good ground of disqualification, because he is
not thereby shown to be 'interested' in the 'case,' not being a party thereto or liable to any loss or
profit therefrom, otherwise than as any other person in the body politic.").
39. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 30.01 (West 2006).
40. See Whitehead v. State, 273 S.W.3d 285, 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (concluding a judge,
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grounds that the judge is a "party injured" is not limited to whether the
judge is the "victim named in the indictment" or information; rather, a
judge will be considered the "party injured"-and therefore disqualified-
"if the evidence shows that he was among the defendant's victims in the
criminal transaction or episode at issue ... such that a reasonable person
would harbor doubts as to the judge's impartiality" even if he is not named
as a victim in the indictment." A judge is not always the "victim" of an
offense committed in her court, so charges of perjury or fabricating
evidence can be presided over by the judge in the court in which the
offenses arose.4 2
It is unclear whether a judge may be disqualified on the basis that he
was a victim of an offense introduced during the punishment stage.
Literally, he would not be the "party injured" in the prosecution and would
not be disqualified under Article 30.01. The Fifth Circuit, however, has
suggested that while a trial judge's admission of such evidence may not rise
to the level of an "indicia of bias sufficient to declare the trial tainted," the
evidence may be 'so unduly prejudicial' that its admission may constitute
who was one of several threatened with retaliation in a letter from the defendant, was disqualified
from presiding over the trial in which another one of those threatened in the letter was named in the
indictment); January v. State, 38 S.W. 179, 179-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1896) (deciding the judge, whose
brother's hog was shot and killed, was an "injured party" under Article 606 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (the precursor of present Article 30.01) and, thus, disqualified from presiding over the
criminal case against the shooter); Ex parte Ambrose, 24 S.W. 291, 292 (Tex. Crim. App. 1893)
(asserting a justice of the peace, who was a victim of an assault, was disqualified from presiding over
his assailant's guilty plea); see also Ex parte Sinegar, No. AP-76,340, 2011 WL 4067402, at *1 (Tex.
Crim. App. Sept. 14, 2011, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (not designated for publication) (holding a
judge was disqualified from presiding over a probation revocation where one of the grounds alleged
was that the defendant had personally threatened the judge); Burkett v. State, 196 S.W.3d 892, 896
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006, no pet.) (recognizing a judge who was sent a threatening letter by the
defendant was disqualified from excusing various pool members who claimed statutory exemptions
in the trial on a charge of terroristic threat). But see Tingler v. State, No. 09-06-00453-CR, 2008 WL
281841, at *2 (Tex. App.-Beaumont Jan. 16, 2008, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (finding a judge was not disqualified as a victim in the case where he requested additional
security during trial due to a threat against his life made by the defendant's mother and where the
defendant was not charged with having threatened the judge).
41. Whitehead, 273 S.W.3d at 288-89.
42. Lane v. State, 634 S.W.2d 65, 66 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no pet.); see Aldridge v.
State, 342 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960) (deciding a judge who was a member of
commissioners court for only thirty-two days was not an "injured party" in a criminal libel action
arising from an editorial accusing the commissioners court of fraud); see also Eggert v. State, No. 11-
10-00177-CR, 2011 WL 817663, at *1 (Tex. App.-Eastland Mar. 10, 2011, no pet.) (per curiam) (not
designated for publication).
43. CRiM. PROC. art. 30.01; see also Kimmell v. Leoffler, 791 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tex. App-San
Antonio 1990, no writ) (per curiam) ("Clearly the disqualification requirement of [R]ule 18b(1)
encompasses only relation by marriage (affinity) or by blood (consanguinity).").
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constitutional error even if the judge could not have been disqualified."
2. The Judge Is Related to the Accused or the Victim
As already observed, all three rules of disqualification prohibit a judge
from presiding over a case in which he may be related to the accused
either by affinity (i.e., marriage) or consanguinity (i.e., blood)." While the
constitution does not set out the necessary degree of relation, except to
provide that it must be "within such a degree as may be prescribed by
law," both Article 30.01 and Rule 18b(1)(c) specify that it must be only to
the third degree.'6  Rule 18b further provides that the degree of
relationship must be calculated "according to the civil law system."
Section 573 of the Government Code sets out the rules for assessing
relationships by consanguinity and affinity." Under the Government
Code, two individuals are connected by blood if one is the progeny of
another "or they share a common ancestor."49  "The degree of
relationship ... between an individual and the individual's descendant is
determined by the number of generations" between them.so Thus, "[a]
parent and child are related in the first degree, a grandparent and
grandchild in the second degree, and a great-grandparent and great-
grandchild in the third degree."" Relationships of consanguinity in which
individuals are not directly descended are calculated on a formula set out in
44. Bigby v. Dretke, 402 F.3d 551, 563-64 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Dawson v. Delaware,
503 U.S. 159, 179 (1992) (finding the trial judge who was attacked by the defendant during the trial
was not required to recuse himself, but admission of evidence of the attack during the punishment
phase may have violated the defendant's due process rights)); see also Wilks v. Israel, 627 F.2d 32, 37
(7th Cir. 1980) (recognizing a defendant's "deliberate attack on the trial judge calculated to disrupt
the proceedings will not force [the] judge out of case," although the appellate court may review the
judge's subsequent rulings for an indicia of bias).
45. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11 ("No judge shall sit in any case. . . where either of the parties
may be connected with the judge, either by affinity or consanguinity, within such a degree as may be
prescribed by law . . . ."); CRIM. PROC. art. 30.01 ("No judge or justice of the peace shall sit in any
case ... where the accused or the party injured may be connected with him by consanguinity or
affinity within the third degree, as determined under Chapter 573, Government Code."); TEx. R. CIV.
P. 18b(a)(3) (requiring judges "must disqualify themselves in any proceedings in which ... either of
the parties may be related to them by affinity or consanguinity within the third degree"); Exparte
Vivier, 699 S.W.2d 862, 863 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (holding a judge
was disqualified because he was related to the defendant).
46. CRIM. PROC. art. 30.01; TEX. R. Civ. P. 18b(a)(3); see Ex Parte Vitier, 699 S.W.2d at 863
(finding a judge was disqualified where he was related to the defendant within the third degree).
47. TEx. R. CIV. P. 18b(d)(2).
48. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 573 (West 2004).
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Section 573.023(b) of the Government Code." The result is that
individual "relatives within the third degree [of] consanguinity are the
individual's:
(1) parent or child (relatives in the first degree); (2) brother, sister,
grandparent, or grandchild (relatives in the second degree); and (3) great-
grandparent, great-grandchild, aunt who is a sister of a parent of the
individual, uncle who is the brother of a parent of the individual, .. . or
[nephew or] niece who is a child of a brother or sister of the individual
(relatives in the third degree)."s3
Two individuals are related by affinity to each other under the Code if
they are married or the spouse of one is related by blood to the other
person." "For other relationships by affinity, the degree of relationship is
the same as the degree of the underlying relationship of consanguinity.""
Thus, a person's "relatives within the third degree of affinity are: anyone
related by consanguinity to the individual's spouse" by the third degree or
"the spouse of anyone related to the individual by consanguinity to the
third degree."56
Curiously, under the Texas Constitution and Rule 18b, a judge is not
disqualified from presiding over a case in which he is related to the victim,
as victims are not "parties" in a criminal action and both provisions only
prohibit a judge from presiding over a case in which he may be related to a
"party."" Article 30.01, however, disqualifies a judge from presiding over
a case "where the accused or the party injured may be connected with him
by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree."" As the "party




56. Id. 573.025(b)(1)-(2); see Lyon v. State, 764 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988)
("Affinity is defined as: [t]he tie which exists between one of the spouses with the kindred of the
other[;] thus, the relations of my wife, her brothers, her sisters, her uncles, are allied to me by affinity,
and my brothers, sisters, etc., are allied in the same way to my wife. But my brother and the sister of
my wife are not allied by the ties of affinity." (quoting Washburn v. State, 318 S.W.2d 627, 639 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1958))), afd, 872 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); see also Johnson v. State,
332 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960) ("Otherwise stated, the rule is that in determining
whether two persons are related by affinity (marriage) the relationship does not exist where more
than one marriage is required to establish it."); Cortez v. State, 161 S.W.2d 495, 497 (Tex. Crim. App.
1942) ("It may not be amiss to here call appellant's attention to the old and familiar adage: 'The
groom and bride each come within. The circle of each other's kin, But kin and kin are still no more
Related than they were before.").
57. See Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 256 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (concluding "[i]n ...
criminal case[s], ... [iut is not possible to have ties of blood or marriage to 'the State'; therefore, a
judge cannot be disqualified due to relationship of consanguinity or marriage with the State).
58. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 30.01 (West 2006).
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injured" under the statute includes the victim,s" a judge is disqualified
under Article 30.01 from any case in which his sibling is the victim, for
example.60 A judge is not disqualified from presiding over a trial in which
the prosecutor, the judge's son, "was the victim's brother's brother-in-
law""6 or in which the judge's wife was the "first cousin to the wife of a
brother of the deceased"' 6  because in neither case was the tie of "affinity
within the third degree."6 3
C. TheJudge Was Counselfor Either Partv in the Case
All three rules for disqualification bar judges from sitting on cases in
which they served as an attorney for one of the parties.64  Texas courts
have interpreted this ground for disqualification narrowly.6 ' A judge is
not disqualified simply because he prosecuted or defended the accused in
59. Mos/y, 983 S.W.2d at 256.
60. Cooparrjanuary v. State, 38 S.W. 179, 179-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1896) (concluding the judge
was disqualified under the Code of Criminal Procedure from presiding over a case in which the
defendant was accused of killing a hog that belonged to the defendant's brother), with Davis v. State,
44 Tex. 523, 524 (1876) (holding the judge was not disqualified under the Texas Constitution,
because "[t]he fact that the presiding judge was the person from whom the property was alleged to be
stolen ... is not a good ground of disqualification, because he is not thereby shown to be 'interested'
in the 'case,' not being a party thereto or liable to any loss or profit therefrom, otherwise than as [a]
person in the body politic").
61. Lyon, 764 S.W.2d at 2.
62. See Washburn v. State, 318 S.W.2d 627, 639-40 (Tex. Crim. App. 1958) ("It is apparent that
under the rules stated Judge Woodley could not be and was not related by affinity to those who are
related to his wife only by affinity-which is the situation here presented.').
63. See Johnson, 332 S.W.2d at 322 (finding the judge, whose wife was the niece of the
defendant's wife, was not disqualified because the judge was not related to the defendant by affinity);
Corte!, 161 S.W.2d at 497 (deciding a juror, whose sibling married the victim's second cousin victim,
was not disqualified because he was not related to the victim by affinity within the third degree). A
relationship of affinity cannot exist "where more than one marriage is required to establish it."
Johnson, 332 S.W.2d at 322.
64. See TEX. CONST. art. V, S 11 ("No judge shall sit in any case wherein ... the judge shall
have been counsel in the case."); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 30.01 (West 2006) ("No judge
or justice of the peace shall sit in any case ... where he has been counsel for the State or the
accused . . . ."); TEX. R. Civ. P. 18b(a)(1) ("A Judge must disqualify in any proceeding in which ...
the judges has served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom the judge
previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter. . . ."); see
also Abram v. State, 20 S.W. 987, 988 (Tex. Crim. App. 1893) (deeming a judge, who had represented
the defendant, including filing a motion for continuance and interviewing the defendant and
witnesses, was disqualified from presiding over the same case).
65. See State ex. rel. Millsap v. Lozano, 692 S.W.2d 470, 475-76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)
(explaining that a judge's qualification is presumed until proven otherwise on a motion to disqualify
"based on strict constitutional grounds" that exclusively "specify all the circumstances that forbid a
judge" from sitting, and distinguishing recusal from the concept of "strict constitutional
disqualification").
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the past.6 6  To be disqualified as previous counsel, the judge must have
been counsel in the specific case she is hearing; the fact that the judge may
have represented or prosecuted the defendant in some other unrelated
case,6 7  or prosecuted or defended one of the convictions used for
enhancement6 8  or introduced during the punishment phase6 1 is not
sufficient grounds to disqualify her.7 0  Moreover, to have "acted as
counsel in the case" means that the judge, while an attorney, actually
investigated, advised, or participated in the case in some way.7 1 The party
seeking to disqualify the judge must affirmatively demonstrate the judge
actually served as counsel in the case in which she is sitting.72 Absent
such a showing, an act of participation will not be imputed to the judge for
purposes of disqualification.7
Based upon this strict interpretation of the phrase "shall have been
66. See Holifield v. State, 538 S.W.2d 123, 125 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (finding the record did
not show the judge participated in the case where he was the district attorney in Randall County
when the offense was indicted in Potter County and there was no showing the case was connected to
Randall County cases); see also Kuykendall v. State, 335 S.W.3d 429, 432-33 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
2010, pet. refd) (rejecting the contention the trial judge was disqualified because he had defended the
accused in a previous case);Hathome v. State, 459 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (adhering
to the well-settled rule a judge is not disqualified because he had prosecuted the defendant in the
past).
67. See Holbeld, 538 S.W.2d at 125 (determining the record did not establish the judge
participated in the case where he was the district attorney in Randall County, the offense was indicted
in Potter County, and there was no showing that the case was connected to Randall County cases).
68. See Hatorne, 459 S.W.2d at 833 (holding "the mere inclusion in the indictment or
information of allegations as to prior convictions (for enhancement of punishment only) does not
disqualify the trial judge because he was of counsel in such prior conviction or convictions for either
the State or the defense," thus finding the judge was not disqualified because he had prosecuted one
of the prior convictions used for enhancement); Kuykendall, 335 S.W.3d at 433 (determining a judge
was not disqualified where he had been defense counsel in two of the convictions used as
enhancements (citing Hathorne, 459 S.W.2d at 829, 833)).
69. See Brown v. State, 108 S.W.3d 904, 908 (rex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. refd) (rejecting
the defendant's argument that the judge was disqualified on grounds he had prosecuted the
defendant in a conviction which was introduced in the punishment stage of the trial as part of
defendant's prior criminal record).
70. See Hathome, 459 S.W.2d at 829 ("It has been held ... that to come within the meaning of
'counsel in the case' in the statute prescribing [disqualification] of judges, it must appear that the
judge acted as counsel in the very case before him.").
71. See Gamez v. State, 737 S.W.2d 315, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (finding the judge was not
a "counsel in the case" and, therefore, disqualified when, as assistant criminal district attorney, he did
not prepare, sign, or stamp the State's written announcement of ready and which was signed with his
stamped signature by someone else).
72. See Hathorne, 459 S.W.2d at 833 (declining to hold the mere allegation of a prior conviction,
in which the judge was of counsel, would work an automatic disqualification).
73. See Ex parte Miller, 696 S.W.2d 908, 909-10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985, orig. proceeding)
(concluding that the necessary affirmative showing of "actual and active participation in the
applicant's conviction" is apparent in the record, and thus finding the judge was disqualified).
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counsel in the case" in Article V, Section 117' and "has been of counsel"
in Article 30.01, 7 Texas courts have held for more than one hundred
years that "the mere fact that a judge was district attorney at the time of
the offense or at the time that the accused was examined or indicted does
not work a disqualification if, when district attorney, he had nothing to do
with the prosecution." Rather, a judge who is a former prosecutor is
disqualified only if the record affirmatively demonstrates that he actively
participated in the very case as a prosecutor.7
74. TEX. CONST. art. V. 5 11.
75. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 30.01 (West 2006).
76. Game. 737 S.W.2d at 319 (citations omitted); see also Ex Parte Miller, 696 S.W.2d at 909-10
(finding the judge, who "had an actual and active participation" as a state's attorney in convicting
appellant, was disqualified from presiding in a subsequent probation revocation since it was "part of
the same ongoing case"); Carter v. State, 496 S.W.2d 603, 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (concluding a
typewritten notation on the docket sheet was not sufficient, on its own, to establish the judge had
been the prosecuting attorney in the case); Rodriguez v. State, 489 S.W.2d 121, 123 (Tex. Crim. App.
1972) (holding the judge was not disqualified where he had been the first assistant in the DA's office
at the time the offense was committed and complaint filed, and his only act in the case was to read
the file); Muro v. State, 387 S.W.2d 674, 676-77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965) (holding the judge, who had
been an assistant district attorney at the time the defendant was first indicted, was not disqualified
where he was assigned to another division at the time and no evidence suggested that he had
participated in the case); Trinkle v. State, 127 S.W. 1060, 1061 (Tex. Crim. App. 1910) (declaring a
judge was not disqualified on grounds that he had once prosecuted the accused on similar charges);
Koening v. State, 26 S.W. 835, 835 (Tex. Crim. App. 1894) (finding the judge was not disqualified
simply because, as county prosecutor, he had once prosecuted the same defendants over the same
charges where the record established the prosecutions were not connected); Utzman v. State, 24 S.W.
412, 412 (Tex. Crim. App. 1893) (judge was not disqualified from presiding over case that had been
indicted when he was district attorney where the record reflected that he "had nothing to do with"
the preparation of the case). In Game, the judge was found to not be disqualified where a signature
stamp on the announcement of ready was the only evidence indicating the judge had participated in
the case. Game7, 737 S.W.2d at 319. The judge also testified he acted as third chair prosecutor and
could not recall having acted in the case. Id. at 319.
77. Compare Game7, 737 S.W.2d at 319 (finding no showing the judge acted as counsel where
the only action he took was to file a form notice of the State's announcement of ready), Mumr, 387
S.W.2d at 676-77 (finding no evidence to disqualify a judge who had been an assistant district
attorney assigned to another division of the office when defendant's case was indicted and he had no
recollection of participating in the case), Holifield v. State, 538 S.W.2d 123, 125 (Tex. Crim. App.
1976) (indicating the record did not show the judge participated in the case where he was the district
attorney in another county and there was no showing the cases were connected), Carter, 496 S.W.2d
at 603-04 (noting there was no showing the judge participated in the case as the district attorney
where the pleadings, judgment, plea, and waivers were all signed by assistant), Rodngue., 489 S.W.2d
at 123 (stating the record did not reflect the judge had participated in the case where he left the
district attorney's office before the indictment was filed), and Ut:man, 24 S.W. at 412 (declining to
hold the judge was disqualified from presiding over a case that was indicted after he resigned as
district attorney and where the record reflected that he "had nothing to do with the prosecution" or
the preparation of the case), adth Ex parte Miller, 696 S.W.2d at 910 (agreeing the judge was
disqualified where the judge who revoked probation was the same attorney who originally prosecuted
the defendant and signed the first motion for revocation of probation), Lee v. State, 555 S.W.2d 121,
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The promulgation of Rule 18b ostensibly places this line of cases in
question." Subsection (a)(1) requires judges to disqualify themselves in
any proceeding in which they "served as a lawyer in the matter in
controversy, or a lanyer ith whom [they] predously practiced law served during such
association as a lanyer concerning the matter."" A plain reading of the rule
would appear to require former district attorneys or assistant district
attorneys to disqualify themselves not only from any case in which they
"actively" participated but also from any case prosecuted in the office at all
during their tenure.so The Court of Criminal Appeals has long recognized
the impracticability of applying such a broad rule to prosecutors,
however." Though the court has yet to specifically address the issue, it
122 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (pointing to the judge's act as prosecutor in writing a letter to defense
counsel informing him that, as supervisor of the trial division, he would not recommend a sentence
lower than life to support a finding of "participation" in the case sufficient to disqualify him), andEx
parte McDonald, 469 S.W.2d 173, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971, orig. proceeding) (finding the judge
was disqualified from presiding over defendant's probation revocation since the judge "was the
district attorney who actively prosecuted the petitioner and obtained a conviction for burglary in the
same cause'.
78. In Arnold, the Court of Criminal Appeals specifically held only that Rule 18a applied in
criminal as well as civil cases but did not address whether Rule 18b would also. See Arnold v. State,
853 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (holding TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a applies to criminal cases
when lacking legislative intent stating otherwise (citing McClenan v. State, 661 S.W.2d 108, 110 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1983))). The court subsequently relied on Rule 18b without comment in Gaal. Gaal v.
State, 332 S.W.3d 448, 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see also Exparte Ellis, 275 S.W.3d 109, 115-16
(Tex. App.-Austin 2008, no pet.) (applying Rule 18b without comment). Lower courts have applied
Rule 18a for a number of years. See Rhodes v. State, 357 S.W.3d 796, 799 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) ("Rule 18b(2) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the law
specifically pertaining to recusal of judges, including recusals in criminal proceedings." (citing Gaal,
332 S.W.3d at 452-53 n.12); see also Kniatt v. State, 239 S.W.3d 910, 914 n.9 (Tex. App.-Waco 2007,
no pet.) (per curiam) (citing Arnold and declaring the Court of Criminal Appeals adopted both
Rule 18a and 18b); Burkett v. State, 196 S.W.3d 892, 896 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006, no pet.)
(applying Rule 18b without comment to reverse and remand); Vargas v. State, 883 S.W.2d 256, 259
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, pet. refd) (relying on Rule 18a to hold the defendant did not
preserve a Rule 18b ground for recusal).
79. TEx. R. CIV. P. 18b(a)(1) (emphasis added).
80. See id. (stating the judge is required to disqualify himself if "a lawyer with whom the judge
previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter"); see also In
re K.E.M., 89 S.W.3d 814, 819-28 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (comparing the scope
of Article 30.01 and Rule 18b(1)(a), which is currently embodied by Rule 18b(a)(1), and concluding
that under the rule, former district attorneys and assistants are disqualified only if they actively
participated in the case, but, under the latter, they are disqualified if they actively participated in the
case or had "supervisory authority . .. at the time the case was investigated, prosecuted, or
adjudicated over attorneys who actually investigated [the case]").
81. See Hathorne v. State, 459 S.W.2d 826, 831-33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (noting the
"harshness" of a rule that would disqualify judges from presiding over cases in which they had
prosecuted one of the enhancements, tracing the history of the rule, and concluding that "[t]o permit
the disqualification to be too easy could cause the cost and the delay of the administration of criminal
justice to go out of bounds").
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could limit the scope of Rule 18b(a)(1) by holding that the legislature, in
repeatedly reenacting Article 30.01, adopted and approved of the courts'
narrow interpretation, and thus the legislature's intent should control over
the supreme court's promulgated rule.8 2
In the alternative, the court could give only limited effect to such a
broad rule of disqualification by taking into consideration the purpose of
the rule," how federal courts8 4 and other state courts85 have interpreted
similar rules, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and the Code of Judicial
Conduct. In light of such authority, the court could limit the application
of Rule 18b(a)(1), as at least one intermediate court has suggested, to the
disqualification of any judge who was a former prosecutor who
(1) personally participated in any way, however slight, in the investigation or
82. See Miller v. State, 33 S.W.3d 257, 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ("'[Wlhen a statute is
reenacted without material change, it is generally presumed that the legislature knew and adopted or
approved the interpretation placed on the original act, and intended that the new enactment should
receive the same construction as the old one." (quoting Exparte Henderson, 565 S.W.2d 50, 54 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1978) (Onion, P.J., concurring))); see also Frieling v. State, 67 S.W.3d 462, 471 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2002, pet. refd) (explaining that if a legislature does not change a particular statute
after a court has interpreted it, courts will presume that it was intended for the same judicial
construction to apply); Arnold v. State, 853 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) ("[We ... hold
Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a applies to criminal cases absent 'any explicit or implidt legislative intent indicating
othenvise."' (emphasis added) (quoting McClenan v. State, 661 S.W.2d 108, 110 (Tex. Crim. App.
1983))). But see Tesco Am., Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc., 221 S.W.3d 550, 553-54 (Tex. 2006)
("Accordingly, our statement in O'Connor that Rule 18b(1)(a) 'recognizes that a judge is vicariously
disqualified under the Constitution' reflected our understanding that the Rule was intended to expound
rather than expand the Constitution." (quoting In re O'Connor, 92 S.W.3d 446, 449 (rex. 2002) (per
curiam) (orig. proceeding))).
83. See Tesco, 221 S.W.3d at 559-60 (Hecht, J., dissenting) ("[The purpose of Article V,
Section 11 is to preserve the appearance of judicial impartiality by prohibiting a judge from sitting in
a case to which he or she has too close a relationship-financial, familial, or professional.").
84. See, e.g., In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 691, 697 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding a reasonable
observer would not have felt the judge was so impartial as to require his disqualification where he
had served in the past as the counsel of the governor who was the subject of the defendant's
investigation that lead to his criminal charges).
85. See State v. Bunker, 874 A.2d 301, 313-14 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (concluding a judge was
not disqualified where "there [was] nothing in the record to indicate that she had any direct
involvement in either [of the defendant's prior] prosecution[s]"); W.I. v. State, 696 So. 2d 457, 457-
58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (declaring, under Florida law, a judge was disqualified because he
prosecuted the defendant in a prior case); People v. Storms, 617 N.E.2d 1188, 1190 (Ill. 1993)
(holding judges in Illinois are not per se disqualified simply because they prosecuted the defendant
for prior offenses); State v. Presley, 94 A.3d 921, 926 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014) ("Because he
had previously prosecuted Collins, the judge here had a non-waivable conflict that required his
disqualification from matters involving her."); State v. Smith (In re Disqualification of Batchelor),
136 Ohio St. 3d 1211, 2013-Ohio-262, 6991 N.E.2d 242, at ¶ 5-6 (concluding Ohio judges are not
disqualified from a case when they served as the prosecutor who obtained three prior convictions
against the defendant).
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prosecution of the same case or of a case arising out of the same set of
operative facts; or (2) [had] supervisory authority ... as prosecutor at the
time the case was investigated, prosecuted, or adjudicated over the attorneys
who actually investigated or prosecuted the same case or a case ansing
[from] the same set of operative facts.8 6
D. The judge Is Biased
Although the Court of Criminal Appeals initially limited the grounds for
disqualification to those outlined in the Texas Constitution and
Article 30.01,8 the court, following Supreme Court precedent, eventually
rejected such a narrow view and held that bias could serve as grounds for
disqualification where "the bias is shown to be of such a nature and to
such an extent as to deny a defendant due process of law."" The Due
Process Clause "clearly" requires a 'fair trial in a fair tribunal' . . . before a
judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome
of his particular case."" Generally, the Supreme Court has recognized
two kinds of judicial bias that may warrant constitutional disqualification:
presumptive bias, which presumes bias under certain specific
circumstances, and actual bias, which focuses not on the circumstances
surrounding the case but the judge's mental and psychological attitude
86. In re K.E.M., 89 S.W.3d 814, 828 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.).
87. See Bright v. State, 556 S.W.2d 317, 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) ("[Blias or prejudice of a
trial judge not based upon [an] interest is not a legal disqualification." (quoting Vera v. State,
547 S.W.2d 283, 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977))), overruled by McClenan v. State, 661 S.W.2d 108 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1983); see also Zima v. State, 553 S.W.2d 378, 379-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (identifying
Article V, Section 11 and Article 30.01 as the exclusive grounds for disqualification), overuled by
McClenan, 661 S.W.2d 108; Aldridge v. State, 342 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960) ("The
constitutional prohibition does not disqualify a judge who is interested in the question to be decided,
but who has no direct and immediate interest in the judgment to be pronounced."); Templin v. State,
321 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tex. Crim. App. 1959) (determining the court has previously held
disqualification cannot be based upon prejudice); Williams v. State, 69 S.W.2d 759, 764 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1934) ("[This court [has] expressed the opinion that the grounds of disqualification of a judge
set out in the Constituted and statute mentioned appeared to be exclusive."); Johnson v. State,
20 S.W. 985, 986 (Tex. Crim. App. 1893) (recognizing other states permit judicial disqualification due
to "prejudice not based on ... property interest" but "Texas has no such judicial disqualifications").
88. McClenan, 661 S.W.2d at 109; see also Cumpian v. State, 812 S.W.2d 88, 91 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1991, no writ) (observing the Court of Criminal Appeals "has added judicial bias" to
grounds for disqualification "where shown to be of such an extent as to deny a defendant due
process" (quoting Crawford v. State, 719 S.W.2d 240, 242-43 (Tex. App.-Eastand 1986, no pet.))).
For a detailed examination of the evolution of the court's approach to bias as a ground for
disqualification, see generally 48B ROBERT P. SCHUWERK & LILLIAN B. HARDWICK, TEXAS
PRACTICE SERIES: HANDBOOK OF TEXAS LAWYER AND JUDICIAL ETHICS § 40:9-10, at 829-60
(2015 ed.).
89. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1997) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46
(1975) (citation omitted)).
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towards the parties.9 0
1. Presumptive Bias
Presumptive bias may be defined by asking "whether, 'under a realistic
appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness,"' any judge's
potential interest in a case 'poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment
that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be
adequately implemented.""' "The inquiry," the Court has observed, "is
an objective one. The Court asks not whether the judge is actually
subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is 'likely'
to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional 'potential for
bias."'92 Presumptive bias is not to be confused with the mere appearance
of judicial bias.9' As several federal appeals courts have acknowledged,
the mere appearance of judicial bias alone is not sufficient grounds to
disqualify a judge.94
The Court has identified at least three9 5  circumstances "in which
90. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 886 (2009) ("The failure to consider
objective standards requiring recusal is not consistent with the imperatives of due process.'; In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (explaining due process "may sometimes bar trial by judges who
have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between
contending parties"); Richardson v. Quarterman, 537 F.3d 466, 475 (5th Cir. 2008) ("In general, the
Supreme Court has recognized 'presumptive bias' as the one type of judicial bias other than actual
bias that requires recusal under the Due Process Clause."); Buntion v. Quarterman, 524 F.3d 664, 672
(5th Cir. 2008) ("Generally, the Supreme Court has recognized two kinds of judicial bias: actual bias
and presumptive bias.").
91. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883-84 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)); see also
Richardson, 537 F.3d at 475 ("Presumptive bias occurs when a judge may not actually be biased, but
has the appearance of bias such that 'the probability of actual bias ... is too high to be
constitutionally tolerable."' (quoting Bun/ion, 524 F.3d at 672)).
92. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 881.
93. See Richardson, 537 F.3d at 478 ('These cases have recognized that the Supreme Court does
not require reversal of a defendant's case on due process grounds merely because a judge may have
appeared to be biased.'.
94. See id. (noting many other appellate courts, including this one, have arrived at the same
conclusion); Davis v. Jones, 506 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 2007) ("[N]one of the Supreme Court
cases relied upon by Davis establishes that an appearance problem violates the Due Process
Clause."); Welch v. Sirmons, 451 F.3d 675, 700 (10th Cit. 2006) (showing multiple examples of
federal appellate courts refusing to apply a principle of judicial disqualification for an appearance of
bias); Johnson v. Carroll, 369 F.3d 253, 263 (3d Cir. 2004) ("In short, bad appearances alone do not
require disqualification . .. ."); United States v. Lowe, 106 F.3d 1498, 1504 (10th Cir. 1997)
("[R]ecusal is not normally required where the judge has expressed 'a determination to impose severe
punishment within the limits of the law upon those found guilty of a particular offense."' (quoting
United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1997))); Del Vecchio v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d
1363, 1371-72 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (stating appearance alone is something not often reviewable
years later in an appellate setting).
95. Various appellate courts, after surveying the Supreme Court cases addressing
94
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experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the
judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable."9 6
Under due process, a judge is constitutionally disqualified as presumptively
biased when: "(1) the judge 'has a direct personal, substantial, and
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case"' (such as financial gain for
his constituency based upon the number of convictions);97 (2) the judge
'has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from [one of] the
part[ies] before him"' (such as a judge who conducts a contempt hearing
concerning attacks made upon him);98 or (3) the judge "'has the dual role
of investigating and adjudicating disputes and complaints"' (such as
determining whether the evidence is sufficient to hold a contempt hearing
and then conducting the hearing and assessing punishment).99 While
intermediate federal courts have suggested there might be other
circumstances under which a judge may be disqualified on the grounds of
disqualification under due process, have identified three sets of circumstances. See Richardson,
537 F.3d at 475 (identifying three circumstances requiring disqualification); Buntion, 524 F.3d at 672
(recognizing the three circumstances that constitutionally require disqualification: (1) when the judge
has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case, (2) when the judge has been criticized openly by a
party, and when a judge has both investigated and adjudicated the case); Bigby v. Dretke, 402 F.3d
551, 559 (5th Cir. 2005) (recognizing the three instances when disqualification is constitutionally
required); Celis v. State, 354 S.W.3d 7, 22 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2011) (applying federal
precedent on constitutionally mandatory disqualification of a judge to a Texas case), afd on other
grounds, 416 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Although, the Supreme Court itself, after reviewing
these cases, identified only two circumstances requiring disqualification. See Caperton, 556 U.S.
at 876-881 (identifying and examining in detail "two instances" where the Court has required
disqualification under due process).
96. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 877 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
97. Richardson, 537 F.3d at 475 (quoting Buntion, 524 F.3d at 672); see Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986) (explaining an appellate justice who had a similar lawsuit against an
insurance company was disqualified from hearing an appeal of issue in an ancillary suit); Ward v. Vill.
of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60-61 (1972) (holding a mayor/justice of the peace was disqualified
from a traffic court where the village benefitted from fines collected, notwithstanding that defendant
could appeal de novo to a higher court); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927) (disqualifying the
judge on grounds the village received a percentage of fines assessed by the mayor/justice of the
peace).
98. Richardson, 537 F.3d at 475 (quoting Buntion, 524 F.3d at 672); see Johnson v. Mississippi,
403 U.S. 212, 215 (1971) (disqualifying a judge from presiding over a case who was subject to
personal attacks and was the losing party in a civil rights lawsuit filed by the defendant); Mayberry v.
Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465-66 (1971) (concluding a judge is disqualified from presiding over a
contempt hearing in which he was the target of contemnor's attacks); Offutt v. United States,
348 U.S. 11, 17-18 (1954) (finding a judge, who "permitted himself to become personally embroiled"
with counsel, was disqualified from conducting contempt proceedings against the attorney).
99. Richardson, 537 F.3d at 475 (quoting Buntion, 524 F.3d at 672); see In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133, 137 (1955) (asserting a judge is disqualified from presiding over proceedings he initiated as a
'one man grand jury').
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presumptive bias,1oo as the Fifth Circuit has observed, almost every bias
case in which the Supreme Court has found a violation of due process
involved one of the three types of presumptive bias already described.'0 '
There appears to be no Texas criminal case of presumptive bias rising to
the level of a due process violation, probably because Article V, section 11
and Article 30.01 are sufficiently broad as to encompass the circumstances
outlined by Supreme Court precedent. Thus, Texas courts would be more
likely to address a disqualification issue under those more precise
provisions than under due process.
2. Actual Bias
The Due Process Clause mandates a defendant be tried before a judge
"with no actual bias against the defendant.""o2 Defining what constitutes
an "actual bias" sufficient to violate the defendant's due process rights has
100. See Richardson, 537 F.3d at 476 (noting the judge "did not stand to gain personally or
professionally if Richardson were sentenced more harshly by the jury"); Del Vechio v. Ill. Dep't of
Corr., 31 F.3d 1363, 1372 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (stating there are many things in a judge's
background that could call for the appearance of bias).
101. See Richardson, 537 F.3d at 476 ("More importantly, it is only clearly established by Supreme
Court precedent that presumptive bias exists in the three circumstances discussed above."); Bundon,
524 F.3d at 672 ("Almost every bias case before the Supreme Court that has found a due process
violation has done so based on presumptive bias."). Compare Caperton, 556 U.S. at 886-87 (stating,
given a party's "significant and disproportionate influence" in a judge's election, coupled with close
temporal relationship between election and submission of case, "the probability of actual bias rises to
an unconstitutional level" requiring disqualification), Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 825-26 (concluding an
appellate justice who had a similar lawsuit against an insurance company was disqualified from
hearing an appeal of issue in an ancillary suit), Ward, 409 U.S. at 60-61 ("This, too, is a 'situation in
which an official perforce occupies two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan
and the other judicial, [and] necessarily involves a lack of due process of law in the trial of defendants
charged with crimes before him."' (alteration in original) (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 534), Johnson,
403 U.S. at 215 (holding a judge who was the losing party in a civil rights lawsuit filed by the
defendant was disqualified from presiding), Maybery, 400 U.S. at 465 (affirming a judge was
disqualified from presiding over a contempt hearing in which he was the target of the contemnor's
attacks), In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 137 (concluding a judge was disqualified from presiding over
proceedings he initiated as a "'one-man grand jury"), Offutt, 348 U.S. at 17-18 (declaring a judge who
permitted himself to become "embroiled" with counsel was disqualified from conducting contempt
proceedings against him), and Tumey, 273 U.S. at 522 (recognizing the general rule "that officers
acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity are disqualified by their interest in the controversy to be
decided"), wdth Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 556 (1994) (stating a judge is not disqualified
under 28 U.S.C. § 455 on the on basis of personal bias where judicial statements at issue occurred in
the course of judicial proceedings and neither relied upon knowledge acquired outside the
proceedings nor displayed deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment
impossible), and Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 36 (1921) (holding a judge was disqualified
under the Judicial Code from presiding over a World War I espionage trial where he declared that
German-Americans' "hearts are reeking with disloyalty").
102. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 905 (1997).
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proved problematic.103 Perhaps due to the fact that bias to such a degree
is so rare, or more probably because personal bias and lack of impartiality
are grounds for recusal under 28 U.S.C. 5 455(a) and Rule 18b(b), neither
the Supreme Court nor the Court of Criminal Appeals has yet to find it
necessary to define "actual bias."'0 4 One Texas intermediate court has
suggested that due process is violated when the impartiality of the judge so
infects the entire trial process that it "robs" the defendant of basic
protections and undermines the reliability of the trial to function as a
vehicle for the determination of guilt or innocence.'o5  Another court,
adopting the Supreme Court's language in Lteky-which addressed
grounds for recusal, not disqualification-has suggested the appropriate
standard investigates whether a judge's behavior "reveal[s] such a high
degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment
impossible."' 
0 6
One area in which the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that a judge's
bias violates due process is a judge's arbitrary refusal to consider the full
range of punishment for an offense.'o "Arbitrary" in this context
"means capricious or unreasonable, or a decision based on uninformed
opinion."'o A judge acts arbitrarily, and thereby violates due process,
103. See id. ("The facts of this case are, happily, not the stuff of typical judicial-disqualification
disputes.'.
104. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2012) (indicating a judge should disqualify himself in certain
instances of potential bias); TEX. R. Civ. P. 18b(b)(1)-(2) (showing certain biases are already grounds
for recusal); see also Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555 (examining actual bias under § 455(a)); Gaal v. State,
332 S.W.3d 448, 452-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (examining actual bias under Rule 18(b)).
105. See Abdygapparova v. State, 243 S.W.3d 191, 210 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, pet.
refd) (holding the judge's negative comments, consistently preferential rulings in the State's favor,
and ex parte communications with prosecutor revealed bias that violated the defendant's due process
right to impartial judge); see also Wilks v. Israel, 627 F.2d 32, 37 (7th Cit. 1980) (asserting a defendant
who attacked a judge and later claimed judicial bias "must show that the refusal to recuse was a
'fundamental defect which inherently result[ed] in a complete miscarriage of justice"' (quoting Hill v.
United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962))); Buckelew v. United States, 575 F.2d 515, 518-19 (5th Cir.
1978) (concluding allegations on collateral attack of judicial misconduct are not cognizable as
violations of due process unless the defendant establishes that the misconduct "rendered... [the]
trial fundamentally unfair"); cf Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (finding a violation of a
prosecutor's duty to disclose favorable evidence violates due process when absence of the evidence
defendant "received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence").
106. Celis v. State, 354 S.W.3d 7, 22 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2011) (quoting Liteky,
510 U.S. at 554), affd on other grounds, 416 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see also Bunfion, 524 F.3d
at 673 (declaring disqualification on grounds of actual bias must show "a deep-seated, extreme
favoritism or antagonism" (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 554)).
107. See McClenan v. State, 661 S.W.2d 108, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) ("A court's arbitraU
refusal to consider the entire range of punishment would constitute a denial of due process . . . .").
108. Roman v. State, 145 S.W.3d 316, 320 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd).
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when he refuses to consider mitigating evidence or when he imposes a
predetermined punishment.'09 A judge commits the former, for example,
when he "strictly adheres" to an "ill-conceived mathematical formula" to
calculate punishment,10 or when he wholly rules out a portion of the
permissible range of punishment before hearing punishment evidence."1
A judge violates the latter when, for example, he places a defendant on
probation, warns the defendant that he will give him a certain sentence if
probation is revoked, and later awards the sentence upon revocation.12
109. See Sosa v. State, 230 S.W.3d 192, 194 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 2005, pet. refd)
(asserting a trial court should consider evidence when imposing a punishment); see also Jaenicke v.
State, 109 S.W.3d 793, 796 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. refd) ("[A] court denies a
defendant due process when it refuses to consider the evidence or when it imposes a predetermined
punishment.'); Buerger v. State, 60 S.W.3d 358, 364 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet.
refd) (holding a judge denies due process when he "arbitrarily refuses to consider the entire range of
punishment for an offense or refuses to consider mitigating evidence and imposes a predetermined
punishment"); Howard v. State, 830 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, pet. refd)
(arguing a denial of due process occurs when a trial judge fails to consider mitigating factors when
imposing a predetermined sentence); Jefferson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1991, pet. refd) (concluding courts should consider evidence when imposing a predetermined
sentence).
110. Compare Hernandez v. State, 268 S.W.3d 176, 184 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2008, no
pet.) (discussing the judge's announcement at the punishment hearing that she intended to double
defendant's pervious longest sentence), with Jaenicke, 109 S.W.3d at 796 (stating the record of the
judge's comments reflects that he considered evidence in the case, and not a formula based on prior
jury verdicts for similar crimes, in assessing maximum punishment).
111. Compare Earley v. State, 855 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, pet.
dism'd) (deciding the judge's warning that he would sentence the defendant to maximum upon
revocation, coupled with his lament at the punishment hearing that he was unable to award even
greater sentence, showed that the judge had "effectively decided the cases before listening to the
evidence"), and Norton v. State, 755 S.W.2d 522, 523 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no pet.)
(finding the judge's declaration at the close of a suppression hearing, in response to his realization
that the defendant had lied to a probation officer, that he would sentence the defendant o jail time
even if the jury recommended probation, indicated that the judge "had dismissed arbitrarily a portion
of the permissible range of punishment"), with Brumit v. State, 206 S.W.3d 639, 645 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006) (concluding a judge who expressed extreme disgust at crime of aggravated sexual assault of a
child while sentencing the defendant o life did not violate due process, in light of fact that his
comments were made at end of the punishment hearing and based upon evidence introduced), Sosa,
230 S.W.3d at 194-95 (holding a judge, who at the close of sentencing expressed antipathy towards
the offense of intoxication manslaughter and recalled witnessing an offense, did not violate
defendant's due process rights in cumulating sentences), and Fielding v. State, 719 S.W.2d 361, 367
(rex. App.-Dallas 1986, pet. refd) (concluding the trial judge did not violate due process in refusing
to consider mitigating evidence that was not admissible at the time of the defendant's sentencing
hearing, even though the judge had threatened the defendant with a sixty year sentence when placing
him on probation).
112. See Jfferson, 803 S.W.2d at 471 (noting a judge threatened the defendant with the maximum
sentence if he violated probation and later sentenced the defendant accordingly); see also Howard,
830 S.W.2d at 787-89 (asserting a judge threatened to assess ninety-nine years upon probation
revocation and later sentenced the defendant to ninety-nine years); Cole v. State, 757 S.W.2d 864,
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Though judicial bias that violates due process constitutes fundamental
error, the Court of Criminal Appeals has declined to address whether a
contemporaneous objection is necessary to preserve error.1" 3
E. Miscellaneous Grounds for Disqualfcation
A number of constitutional and statutory provisions address a judge's
qualifications to hold the office that, arguably, could constitute grounds to
disqualify a judge, including the judge's personal qualifications to hold the
office and the requirement of an oath."' The right of a judge to the
office in which he functions may not be attacked collaterally; however, if a
party wishes to challenge the judge's authority he must bring a direct
action through a quo warranto proceeding.1s
Although rare, a judge who has been convicted of or granted deferred
adjudication for a felony or misdemeanor involving official misconduct is
"automatically removed" from the bench."' The provision, however,
does not take effect until there is a written judgment entered into the
record."' In addition, a judge may be suspended from office pending the
outcome of a disciplinary proceeding and thus, disqualified from presiding
over any proceeding." 8
865-66 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, pet. refd) (holding a trial judge violated due process in
deciding punishment before conducting a sentencing hearing, but error was waived by the
defendant's failure to object).
113. See Brumit, 206 S.W.3d at 644-45 (holding the issue of the necessity of a contemporaneous
objection need not be addressed since the record did not reflect judicial bias but suggesting that
Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), and Rule 33.1 of the Appellate Rules apply).
But see Blue v. State, 41 S.W.3d 129, 132-33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (concluding, under Mains, the
defendant did not have to object to judge's comments to jury revealing existence of plea negotiations
that may have created juror bias against defendant).
114. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2(b) (detailing the qualifications for Supreme Court justice); id
art. V, § 4(a) (outlining the qualifications for a Court of Criminal Appeals judge); id. art. V, § 7
(providing the qualifications for district court judge); id. art. XVI, § I (furnishing the requirement of
an anti-bribery oath); id art. XVI, 5 5 (compelling disqualification for offering or accepting a bribe);
see also Lackey v. State, 364 S.W.3d 837, 841 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (concluding a visiting judge was
not statutorily qualified to serve); Espinosa v. State, 115 S.W.3d 64, 66-67 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2003, no pet.) (holding a judge was not disqualified for failure to file an anti-bribery oath as required
by Article XVI, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution).
115. Espinosa, 115 S.W.3d at 66; Gonzales v. State, 938 S.W.2d 482, 484-85 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1996, pet. refd).
116. TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 33.038 (West 2004); see also Mastrangelo v. State, No. 09-05-
00337-CR, 2007 WL 1052438, at *2-3 (Tex. App.-Beaumont Apr. 4, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (confirming a judge will be automatically removed if convicted of a felony
or misdemeanor).
117. See Mastrangelo, 2007 WL 1052438, at *2-3 (holding appellant did not show the trial judge
was disqualified from sitting on the dates the judge presided over the case).
118. See Medina v. State, 743 S.W.2d 950, 953-54 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, pet. refd)
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III. RECUSAL
Rule 18b(b) sets out eight grounds for recusal,"'1 which are discussed in
detail below. Subsection (c) of the rule requires each judge to "inform
himself about his personal and fiduciary financial interests[] and make a
reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal interests of his
spouse and minor children residing in his household."'2 0 The provision
seems superfluous in light of the extensive disclosure requirements of the
Government Code.121
Rule 18b also provides "the parties to a proceeding may waive any
ground for recusal after it is fully disclosed on the record."'2 2 Though the
subsection appears to suggest a potentially prejudiced party may not
unilaterally waive recusal once it has been raised, more probably it merely
constitutes an attempt to distinguish recusal, which can be waived, from
disqualification, which cannot.123  The rule does not address the mirror
opposite of the parties agreeing to waive recusal: Can a judge, with the
party's acquiescence, recuse himself when there is little or no basis for
recusal, simply as a matter of expedience? The courts have suggested
judges have a general obligation to decide matters brought before them
and, therefore, they should not "unnecessarily" recuse themselves.124
(discussing constitutional mechanisms for suspending judges and holding, since the judge under the
indictment was not suspended at the time he presided, he was not disqualified from the case).
119. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18b(b)(1)-(8).
120. Id. R. 18b(c).
121. See general# TEX. Gov. CODE ANN. % 572.021-.0252 (West 2004 & Supp. 2012)
(discussing the personal financial disclosure requirements for government officials).
122. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(e).
123. See Gamez v. State, 737 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (holding disqualification
cannot be waived by the parties); see also Abram v. State, 20 S.W. 987, 988 (Tex. Crim. App. 1893)
(concluding a judge who had represented the defendant in a case before taking the bench was
disqualified from the same case, notwithstanding the fact the defendant suggested appointment of
the judge and both parties agreed to his appointment). But see Exparte Richardson, 201 S.W.3d 712,
714 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (finding a defendant who pled true to revocation before a judge, who he
knew had been the prosecutor in the original prosecution, could not raise the issue of disqualification
on collateral attack).
124. See Ex parte Ellis, 275 S.W.3d 109, 115 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, no pet.) ("Judges are
obligated to decide matters presented to them and must not unnecessarily recuse themselves."); In re
K.E.M., 89 S.W.3d 814, 819 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (stating judges have "as much
of an obligation not to step down from a case when there is no reason to do so as they have to do so
when there is a reason"); Sears v. Olivarez, 28 S.W.3d 611, 614 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no
pet.) ("All judges have the duty to sit and decide matter brought before them, unless there is a basis
for disqualification or recusal. In fact ... this duty, on some occasions, overrides the judge's personal
preference."); see also Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 823-24 (Tex. 1972) (per curiam)
(finding a justice who had voluntarily recused himself should not be recused and holding it was his
"duty" to participate in the case).
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A. Judge's Impartiality Might Reasonably Be Questioned 25
As the Court of Criminal Appeals has observed, "there is much overlap
between" the ground for recusal under Rule 18b(b)(1), that a judge's
"'impartiality might reasonably be questioned,"' and the ground under
subsection (b)(2), that the judge 'has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning the subject matter or a party, or personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.""2  Indeed, unlike
many statutes and rules, Rule 18b(b) appears to present its catch-all
provision before setting out more specific rules; as the Court of Criminal
Appeals has suggested, subsection (b)(1) "appears to be [a ground] that
parties may use when in doubt as to any more concrete reason why the
judge should not preside."'2  Perhaps in an attempt to give it more
substance, the court concluded a judge's impartiality might be reasonably
questioned "only if it appears that he or she harbors an aversion,
hostility[] or disposition of a kind that a fair-minded person could not set
aside when judging the dispute."1 2 This definition requires a
complaining party to produce actual evidence of "aversion, hostility[] or
disposition," which must then be measured against the objective standard
of a "fair-minded person" as a basis for recusal under the otherwise overly
vague ground. In addition, the court acknowledged a "high degree of
favoritism or antagonism" that would "make fair judgment impossible"
might also require recusal under subsection (b) (1).129
125. The Rules of Civil Procedure provide for recusal when "[the judge's] impartiality might
reasonably be questioned." TEX. R. Civ. P. 18b(b)(1).
126. Gaal v. State, 332 S.W.3d 448, 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting TEX. R. CIV.
P. 18b(b)(l)-(2) (noting similarities between two subsections of the rule)).
127. Id. (quoting 48B ROBERT P. SCHUWERK & LILLIAN B. HARDWICK, TEXAS PRACTICE
SERIES: HANDBOOK OF TEXAS LAWYER AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, § 40.23, at 750 (2015 ed. 2015)); see
also Ludlow v. DeBerry, 959 S.W.2d 265, 282 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ)
("[Rule 18b(b)(1)] provides a broad ground, regarding reasonable questions as to the judge's
impartiality. This broad ground may encompass actions other than those specifically enumerated in
Sections [(2)-(8)].').
128. Gaal, 332 S.W.3d at 453 (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 558 (1994)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
129. Id. at 454; see Kniatt v. State, 239 S.W.3d 910, 918 (Tex. App.-Waco 2007, no pet.) (per
curiam) (concluding a judge's opinions may not form the basis for recusal "unless they display a
deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible" (quoting Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 556-56 (1994)); see also Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 240
(Tex. 2001) (applying the "fair judgment impossible" test in civil cases). The Gaal court also noted,
however, at least four justices of the Supreme Court have cast doubt on the relationship of such a
test to the "impartiality might reasonable be questioned" standard embodied in the federal rule. Gaal,
332 S.W.3d at 454 n.22; see also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 563-64 (1994) (Kennedy, J.
concurring) (finding the majority's standard too limited to achieve just results).
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Thus, it appears a party seeking to recuse a judge under Rule 18b(b)(1)
must show: either (1) the judge, through words or action, evinced an
"aversion, hostility, or disposition" toward him, his counsel, or the offense
(2) was of such a kind (3) that a "fair-mined person could not set [it] aside
when judging the dispute"13 0 or (1) the judge harbors favoritism toward
his opponent or antagonism toward him, his counsel, or the offense (2) to
such a degree (3) "as to make fair judgment impossible."'
Subsequent lower court decisions have ignored Gaal v. State,132
however, and have relied instead upon an earlier Texas Supreme Court
test, asking "whether a reasonable member of the public at large, knowing
all the facts in the public domain concerning the judge's conduct, would
have a reasonable doubt that the judge is actually impartial."13 3  The
courts appear to be clinging to an appearance of impropriety standard that
the Court of Criminal Appeals, other courts, and commentators have
rejected.'3 4
130. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 558.
131. See Gaal, 332 S.W.3d at 454 ("A judge's remarks during trial ... will require recusal if they
reveal 'such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible."'
(quoting IUteky, 510 U.S. at 558 (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
132. Gaal v. State, 332 S.W.3d 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
133. Duffey v. State, 428 S.W.3d 319, 325 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2014, no pet.) (quoting
Rogers v. Bradley, 909 S.W.2d 872, 881 (rex. 1995)); Lewis v. State, No. 02-13-00367-CR, 2014 WL
7204708, at *6 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Dec. 18, 2014, pet. refd) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (quoting Dufe), 428 S.W.3d at 325).
134. See Bowen v. Carnes, 343 S.W.3d 805, 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (rejecting appearance
of impropriety as the sole basis to disqualify the defense counsel); Landers v. State, 256 S.W.3d 295,
310 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (rejecting appearance of impropriety alone as the basis to disqualify the
district attorney); State ex rl. Eidson v. Edwards, 793 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (overruling
the trial courts disqualification of the district attorney's office on the sole ground of appearance of
impropriety); see also Fero v. Kerby, 39 F.3d 1462, 1478 (10th Cit. 1994) ("Without an incentive for
actual bias, however, disqualification is not required regardless of appearance. This is so because at
some point a biasing influence becomes too remote and insubstantial to violate due process."
(citations omitted)); Del Vecchio v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363, 1372 (7th Cit. 1994) (en banc)
("When the Supreme Court talks about the 'appearance of justice,' it is not saying that bad
appearances alone require disqualification; rather, it is saying that when a judge is faced with
circumstances that present 'some [actual] incentive to find one way or the other' or 'a real possibility
of bias,' a court need not examine whether the judge actually was 'biased."' (first quoting Margoles v.
Johns, 660 F.2d 291, 297 (7th Cir. 1981); and then quoting Bradshaw v. McCotter, 796 F.2d 100, 102
(5th Cir. 1986))); Waters v. Kemp, 845 F.2d 260, 265 n.12 (11th Cir. 1988) ("[A]n 'appearance of
impropriety is too slender a reed on which to rest a disqualification order except in the rarest of
cases. This is particularly true where ... the appearance of impropriety is not very clear."' (quoting
Bd. of Ed. of N.Y. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979))); United States v. Judge, 625 F.
Supp. 901, 903 (D. Haw. 1986) (rejecting appearance of impropriety as grounds for disqualification
or recusal), affd, 855 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1988) (unpublished table decision); Haraguchi v. Superior
Court, 182 P.3d 579, 589 (Cal. 2008) ("Only an actual likelihood of unfair treatment, not a subjective
perception of impropriety, can warrant a court taking the significant step of recusing an individual
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The courts have also made clear that, in general, the necessary showing
may not be based "solely on judicial rulings, remarks, or actions" as they
"can only[,] in the rarest circumstances[] evidence the degree of favoritism
or antagonism required"13' and "will usually be grounds for reversal if in
error, but not for recusal."1 3 6  "'Expressions of impatience,
dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of
what imperfect men and women' may display, do not establish" partiality,
so that a trial judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration will not
make him subject to recusal.'" Indeed, even violation of a rule of judicial
conduct will not form a basis for recusal unless the conduct rises to the
requisite level of partiality.' 3 8
prosecutor or prosecutor's office."); Haywood v. State, 344 S.W.3d 454, 463 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2011, pet. struck) (rejecting appearance of impropriety as basis to disqualify district attorney); Hanley
v. State, 921 S.W.2d 904, 909 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, pet. ref'd) (trial court did not err in overruling
motion to disqualify on grounds of appearance of impropriety); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS § 7.1.4, at 319-23 (Practitioner's ed. 1986) (characterizing "appearance of
impropriety" analysis as "illusory," "methodological[ly] weak[]," "irrelevant or redundant," and
"unfortunate"); John F. Sutton, Jr., Introduetion to Conflicts ofInterest Symposium: Ethics, Law, and Remedies,
16 REV. LITIG. 491, 511 (1998) (characterizing "appearance of impropriety" ground for
disqualification as "unnecessary" and "paternalistic").
135. Compare Gaal, 332 S.W.3d at 454, 457-58 (holding recusal on grounds that impartiality
might be questioned was not supported by the judge's mere rejection of a plea bargain with a
comment that he would not accept any plea bargain lower than the maximum, in light of the
defendant's repeated acceptance and then rejection of prior plea deals), Rhodes, 357 S.W.3d at 800-01
(finding a judge did not display a lack of impartiality in categorically rejecting any plea bargain that
included placing the defendant in a diversion program where the judge indicated that he disagreed
with the public policy behind the program), and Mwalili v. State, No. 14-11-00018-CR, 2011 WL
6287970, at *3 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 15, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated
for publication) ("Here, [the judge] has the discretion to reject [certain DWI-affiliated] plea
agreements."), with Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 29 (1921) (noting the judge remarked of a
German-American defendant, "Your hearts are reeking with disloyalty"), United States v. Figueroa,
622 F.3d 739, 744 (7th Cit. 2010) (commenting a "litany of inflammatory remarks undermined"
judge's protestations of impartiality), In re United States, 614 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2010) (indicating
the record revealed "unreasonable fury" toward government lawyers), and Kniatt, 239 S.W.3d at 911-
12 (concluding a trial judge displayed impartiality by revoking the defendant's bond merely because
he invoked his right to a jury trial).
136. See Gaal, 332 S.W.3d at 454 ("Almost invariably, judicial rulings] are proper grounds for
appeal, not recusal" (quoting Liteky, 510 S.W.3d at 555-56)); Rhodes, 357 S.W.3d at 800 ("Recusal is
generally not required purely on the basis of judicial rulings, remarks, or actions, as they would not
on their own typically 'evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required'; these will usually
be grounds for reversal if in error, but not for recusal." (quoting Goal, 332 S.W.3d at 457)); see also
Kniatt, 239 S.W.3d at 918 (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56) (analyzing Litekys holding on judicial
remarks and their effect on the recusal of judges).
137. Gaal, 332 S.W.3d at 454 (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56).
138. See Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 121 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (indicating a judge was
not subject to recusal for violating the rule against ex parte communications); Kemp v. State, 846
S.W.2d 289, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (noting the applicable provision of the judicial Code was
deleted by the time of the trial's conclusion but the violation would not have supported recusal even
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B. Judge's Personal Bias or Personal Knowledgel3 9
Subsection (b)(2), the Court of Criminal Appeals has observed, is more
specific than (b)(1).' 40 The next grounds for recusal under Rule 18b
"covers how the judge feels and what the judge knows."' The
subsections actually set out two separate bases for recusal: (1) that "the
judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning the subject matter or
party" or (2) "the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary
facts concerning the proceeding."' A party is not required to prove
both to be entitled to relief.
1. Personal Bias or Prejudice
A bias or prejudice against the subject matter or a party that derives
from an extrajudicial source is a "common basis" for disqualification or
recusal." A judge who reveals a bias or prejudice that stems from an
extrajudicial source is subject to recusal because the favorable or
unfavorable disposition or opinion is "somehow wrongful or inappropiate,
either because it is undeserved or because it rests upon knowledge that the
subject ought not possess."' 4 4  For purposes of recusal, an "extrajudicial
source" may be loosely defined as "something taking place 'outside [the]
court' or 'outside the functioning of the court system"'1 4s that "result[s] in
an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned
from his participation in the case."'4 6  A judge's mere personal
acquaintance with a party or counsel, without more, does not require
if applicable); f House v. State, 947 S.W.2d 251, 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (holding there was no
need to examine a particular rule of appellate procedure because the defendant could show no actual
prejudice); Brown v. State, 921 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (holding a violation of the
ethical rules alone will not entitle the defendant to a reversal of his conviction unless he can establish
a due process violation as well).
139. Rule 18b recuses a judge when "[the judge] has a personal bias or prejudice concerning the
subject matter or a party," or "personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding." TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(b)(2)-(3).
140. Gaal, 332 S.W.3d at 453.
141. Id.
142. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(b)(2)-(3).
143. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994) (stressing an extrajudicial source is the
only common, rather than exclusive, basis for disqualification and a judge's predisposition may also
be considered bias or prejudice).
144. Abdygapparova v. State, 243 S.W.3d 191, 198 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, pet. refd)
(quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 550).
145. Roman v. State, 145 S.W.3d 316, 321 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. refd)
(quoting Extrajudicial, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999)).
146. Kemp v. State, 846 S.W.2d 289, 306 (rex. Crim. App. 1992) (quoting United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966)).
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recusal on the basis of bias from an outside source.'4 7 A judge's
involvement in prior proceedings, including an earlier prosecution of the
defendant, the trial of a co-defendant, or the issuance of a search or arrest
warrant, does not constitute an "extrajudicial source" under the rule. 1 4
On the other hand, a judge's ex parte communications with one of the
parties concerning a proceeding may be considered an extrajudicial source,
depending upon the circumstances. 1 4 ' Similarly, a judge's involvement in
a prior unrelated case as counsel may not necessarily constitute bias from
an extrajudicial source, depending upon the circumstances.'so
147. See Woodruff v. Wright, 51 S.W.3d 727, 738 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. denied)
(holding the fact that the judge performed a wedding ceremony for a party, and the party had
performed heart surgery on the judge's mother, did not require recusal); see also Clark v. Smith Cty.
Dist. Att'ys Office, No. 12-09-00353-CV, 2011 WL 3503138, at *2 (Tex. App.-Tyler Aug. 10, 2011,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding a judge need not be recused on the basis that he had once worked
closely with the district attorney when he had been employed in the district attorney's office); Dallas
v. State, No. 01-96-00169-CR, 1999 WL 681881, at *3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 31,
1999, pet refd) (not designated for publication) (finding no abuse of discretion in overruling the
motion to recuse on the basis the judge and the state's witnesses were close friends, where the judge
received a special rate at auto shop owned by witnesses and one witness worked on the judge's
campaign); Lueg v. Lueg, 976 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied)
(determining there was no abuse of discretion in denial of the motion to recuse where the judge and
counsel were close friends and counsel had served as the judge's campaign manager); Sonnier v.
State, 764 S.W.2d 348, 353 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, no pet.) (asserting a close friendship with
the victim is insufficient to establish disqualification).
148. See Kemp, 846 S.W.2d at 306 (stating the fact the judge issued the search and arrest
warrants did not constitute "extrajudicial source" requiring recusal); Durrough v. State, 620 S.W.2d
134, 143 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (asserting appellate judges who voted earlier to permit the State to
seek mandamus could not be recused on the ground that they had developed an extrajudicial bias
against defendant); Roman, 145 S.W.3d at 321-22 (establishing knowledge gained from trial of co-
defendant does not constitute an extrajudicial source for purposes of recusal); see also Withrow v.
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 56 (1975) (determining an administrative board that initially concluded there was
probable cause to believe a defendant had committed certain acts was not "extrajudicially biased"
against the defendant in a later hearing).
149. CompareAbdygapparova, 243 S.W.3d at 209-10 (declaring a judge's ex parte communications
with the prosecution during voir dire was part of "an ongoing, continuous bias or prejudice" which
justified reversal and re-trial before another judge), with In e Fifty-One Gambling Devices,
298 S.W.3d 768, 776 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2009, pet. struck) (stating a judge's ex parte instruction to
the district attorney to prepare a notice based upon a notice the judge had prepared in a case a year
earlier did not require recusal), and Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 120-21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)
(concluding the prosecutor's ex parte communications-three days before the start of trial-with the
judge concerning investigation into the defendant's attempt to solicit murder of witnesses did not
warrant the judge's recusal).
150. Compare Ex parte Ellis, 275 S.W.3d 109, 120-21 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, no pet.)
(stressing an appellate justice's statements as counsel in an earlier case, similar to the cause before the
court, did not warrant recusal on the basis of extrajudicial bias), with De Leon v. Aguilar, 127 S.W.3d
1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (declaring a judge who was accused of misconduct as a lawyer by counsel
in case, and who was ordered recused in a subsequent case involving same counsel, should have
recused himself from present case as a matter of law).
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Additionally, while campaign contributions cannot generally serve as a
ground for recusal, in extreme circumstances, they may warrant not simply
recusal but disqualification.15 1
At one time, Texas courts maintained that "personal bias" constituted
grounds for recusal only when the bias stemmed from an "extrajudicial
source."'s2 Following more recent Supreme Court analysis,1 s3 however,
the Court of Criminal Appeals and intermediate courts have acknowledged
that while bias stemming from an extrajudicial source may be one ground
for recusal, it is not the sole ground under Rule 18b(b)(2).s' Thus,
"'predispositions developed during the course of a trial will sometimes
(albeit rarely) suffice' to establish judicial bias."1 5 5 The standard the party
seeking recusal must establish is the same as that under subsection (b)(1):
[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events
occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings,
do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a
151. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 886-87 (2009) (emphasizing a
corporation's "significant and disproportionate influence" on judicial election created probability of
actual bias that violated due process). Compare DeGarmo v. State, 922 S.W.2d 256, 267-68 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. refd) (asserting $500 in campaign contributions from the
victim's family did not establish bias), with Richardson v. State, 83 S.W.3d 332, 358-59 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 2002, pet. rePd) (concluding the hearing judge erred in not ordering the recusal of the
judge whose wife was active in Junior League, the League had supported the judge in his campaigns,
the victim was a junior League member, and both his wife and League members expressed
disagreement with bond shortly before the judge raised bond to $1,000,000).
152. E.g., Kemp, 846 S.W.2d at 305-06 ("[It is beyond rational dispute that before alleged bias
becomes sufficient to warrant the disqualification of a judge, it must 'stem from an extrajudicial
source. . . ."' (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1996))).
153. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550 (1994) ("It is wrong in theory ... to
suggest ... that 'extrajudicial source' is the only basis for establishing disqualifying bias or prejudice.
It is the only common basis, but not the exclusive one, since it is not the exclusive reason a
predisposition can be wrongful or inappropriate.").
154. See Gaal v. State, 332 S.W.3d 448, 459 & n.48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ("[S]uch bias or
partiality may be grounds for a recusal motion, but only if it displays 'a deep-seated favoritism or
antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible."'(emphasis added)); Celis v. State, 354 S.W.3d
7, 22 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2011) (affirming there are two ways to disqualify a judge (1) by "an
opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source" or (2) "a high degree of favoritism" (quoting
Likety, 510 U.S. at 555)), afd on other grounds, 416 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Avilez v. State,
333 S.W.3d 661, 675 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. refd) (restating the two valid bases
for a motion to recuse); Abdygapparova, 243 S.W.3d at 198 (stressing extrajudicial source is not the
exclusive basis for establishing bias); Roman v. State, 145 S.W.3d 316, 321-22 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2004, pet. refd) (alleging there is only one other basis for bias other than extrajudicial
source).
155. Ce/is, 354 S.W.3d at 21-22 (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 554); see also Gaal 332 S.W.3d
at 459 n.48 ("Although our 1992 decision in Kemp quoted an earlier Supreme Court decision that had
stated that on# 'extrajudicial sources' of bias or prejudice may serve as a basis for disqualification or
recusal, it was [superseded] by the 1994 Liteky decision.").
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deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment
impossible.156
The Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals have implied,
but not explicitly stated, that the threshold for recusal arising from an
extrajudicial source is lower than that for recusal based upon a bias arising
solely from judicial proceedings by suggesting that courtroom remarks that
reveal an extrajudicial source may establish bias sufficient to require
recusal, while the same remarks without an extrajudicial source will
support recusal only if they rise to the level favoritism or antagonism as to
make fair judgment impossible.
2. Personal Knowledge of Disputed Evidentiary Facts Concerning
Proceedings
In what appears to be a variation of the extrajudicial source rule,
subsection (2)(b) also mandates recusal when the judge possesses
"personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding."' The exception requires recusal only when the judge
possesses knowledge of "disputed" facts, so that, in theory, a judge with
knowledge of facts agreed upon or not in dispute would not be subject to
recusal under the rule.' 5 9
C. Judge as a Matenal Witness in the Case' 6 0
Subsection (b)(4) requires a judge's recusal where the judge "or a lawyer
with whom he previously practiced law has been a material witness" in the
proceeding.'"' Unlike subsection (b)(3), subsection (b)(4) is not limited to
disputed facts, so a judge is subject to recusal under the rule even if he
156. Gaal, 332 S.W.3d at 454 (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555); Avile, 333 S.W.3d at 675
(quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555).
157. See Gaal, 332 S.W.3d at 454 ("[A] judge's remarks during trial that are critical, disapproving
or hostile to counsel, the parties, or their cases, usually will not support a bias or partiality challenge,
although they may do so if they reveal an opinion based on extrajudicial sources, and they will require
recusal if they reveal 'such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment
impossible."' (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555)).
158. TEx. R. CIV. P. 18b(b)(3); see Gentry v. State, No. 06-05-00237-CR, 2006 WL 932057,
at *1 (Tex. App.-Texarkana Apr. 12, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(concluding a judge was disqualified because he "explicidy stated on two occasions that he was
making his ruling based on his personal knowledge about the sequence of events").
159. TEx. R. Civ. P. 18b(b)(3).
160. Rule 18b demands the recusal of a judge when "[the judge] or a lawyer with whom he
previously practiced law has been a material witness concerning [the proceeding]." Id R. 18b(b)(4).
161. Id.
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testified to an uncontroverted material fact.162  On its face, the rule does
not require recusal if the judge or a lawyer from his former practice has
testified concerning a non-material issue, even if the issue was
controverted.1 6 3  If the inclusion of the members of the judge's previous
firm in the grounds for recusal is aimed at keeping a judge from presiding
over cases in which another lawyer prepared documents at issue in the
case, and thus the judge might possess some explicit or imputed privileged
information about the case, the basis for recusal is overbroad, as its
application is not limited in time.1 64  More probably, the rule is designed
to prevent public speculation that a judge took counsel's side in an issue
merely on the basis of their prior relationship.
D. Judge as an Attorney in the Case'6
Rule 18b(b)(5) requires a judge's recusal if he "participated" in a matter
in controversy as a "counsel, adviser, or material witness," or conveyed his
opinion concerning its merits, while "acting as an attorney in government
service."'6 6 Since other rules of disqualification address potential conflicts
of interest arising from a judge having participated in a case as a
prosecutor, 16 subsection (b)(5) appears to be aimed at government
attorneys "participating" in the drafting and passing of legislation, either as
legislative counsel, an outside advisor, or a witness at a legislative hearing.
The rule is broader than merely prohibiting lawyers who drafted a statute
from ruling on its meaning or constitutionality; the subsection also
requires recusal if the judge, while "acting as an attorney in government
162. Compare id. R. 18b(b)(3) ("A judge shall recuse himself in any proceeding in which ... the
judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding."), with id.
R. 18b(b)(4) ("A judge shall recuse himself in any proceeding in which ... the judge or a lawyer with
whom the judge previously practiced law has been a material witness concerning it.").
163. See id. R. 18b(b)(4) ("A judge shall recuse himself in any proceeding in which . .. the judge
or a lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law has been a material witness concerning
it.'.
164. Cf Hathorne v. State, 459 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (concluding, in
criminal cases, a judge is only disqualified due to his prior association with a law firm when "the
judge acted as counsel in the vey case before him;" he is not disqualified for all cases against the other
party (emphasis added)).
165. Rule 18b provides for recusal when "the judge participated as counsel, adviser or material
witness in a matter in controversy, or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of it, while acting
as an attorney in government service." TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(b)(5).
166. Id.
167. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 30.01 (West 2006) ("No judge ... shall sit in any
case ... where he has been counsel for the State . .. ."); TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(a)(1) ("Judges shall
disqualify themselves in all proceedings in which .. they have served as a lawyer in the matter in
controversy. . . .").
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service," "expressed an opinion concerning the merits" of "a matter in
controversy."'6 8  The rule thus requires recusal not only of any
government lawyer who actually worked on the legislation but also any
government lawyer who publically commented upon it either before or
after its passage. Unless the phrase "acting as an attorney in government
service" is narrowly restricted to public expressions of opinion issued in an
official capacity, the prohibition is probably subject to First Amendment
attack.1 6' The rule does not bar a judge who, as a private attorney, acting
either in her capacity as a citizen-lawyer or as an advocate for a client, may
have "participated" in the preparation of legislation or may have
commented upon it.' 7 0
E. Other Judiial Interests Requiring Recusal 171
Rule 18b(b)(6) requires a judge to recuse himself when he, or his
spouse, or a minor in his household have a "financial interest in the
subject matter in controversy" or may be "substantially affected by the
168. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18b(b)(5).
169. Cf Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding the prohibition
against judicial candidates announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues violated the
First Amendment); Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1051-52 (1991) (finding the state
bar's limitation on a lawyer's speech unconstitutionally vague and addressing the balance of First
Amendment rights of attorneys and the state's interest in a fair trial); Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline
v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 431 (Tex. 1998) (asserting the standard in Gentile may broaden an
attorney's protection under the First Amendment).
170. See Ex pare Ellis, 275 S.W.3d 109, 119 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, no pet.) ("[O]pinions
expressed by an individual prior to becoming a judge generally should not prevent him from sitting as
a judge because there is a distinction between having personal views and complying with the
obligations judges take an oath to uphold and because 'every good judge is fully aware of the
distinction."' (quoting White, 536 U.S. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting)); cf Chastain v. State,
667 S.W.2d 791, 796 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, pet. refd) (concluding a judge is not
subject to recusal due to his expression of the belief that the death penalty was a deterrent).
171. Rule 18b has three provisions which relate to familial bases for judicial recusal:
(6) The judge knows that the judge, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse or minor
child residing in the judge's household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in
controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceeding; (7) the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person
within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a personj] (A) is
either a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director or trustee of a party; (B) is known by the
judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
or (C) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding[; and] (8) the
judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the first degree of relationship to either of them,
or the spouse of such a person, is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(b)(6)-(8).
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outcome of the proceeding." 1 7  Similarly, subsection (7) requires recusal
of a judge when he, or his spouse, or any person within the third degree of
either, is a party to the proceeding, is known by the judge to have an
interest in the proceeding, or is likely to be a witness.1 73  Finally,
subsection (8) requires a judge to recuse himself if "he, or his spouse, or a
person within the first degree of relationship to either of them, or the
spouse of such a person" appears as a lawyer in the proceeding.' All
three provisions expand the grounds of disqualification under Rule 18b(a)
to include relationships by marriage that are not included under the
statutory rules of affinity.175 To put it another way, under subsections (6)
through (8), personal relationships by marriage that do not require
disqualification may nevertheless require recusal, depending upon the
degree of relationship.
IV. PROCEDURE FOR DISQUALIFICATION AND RECUSAL
Rule 18a of the Rules of Civil Procedure governs the procedure for
both disqualification and recusal "in any trial court other than a statutory
probate court or justice court."'7 6  The Rules of Appellate Procedure
provide no mechanism for raising the issue of disqualification in appellate
courts, though it does spell out the specific grounds for disqualification,
while Rule 16.3 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure controls the
procedure for the recusal of appellate court judges or justices.17 7
Rule 18a, though added by the Texas Supreme Court to the civil rules in
1980, was not held to apply in criminal cases until the early 1990s.178
While the Rules of Appellate Procedure govern the procedure for recusal,
172. Id. R. 18b(b)(6).
173. Id. R. 18b(2)(7).
174. Id. R. 18b(2)(8).
175. See id. R. 18b(2)(6)-(8) (stating the various ways in which a familial relationship can require
a judge to recuse himself; see also TEX. GoV'T CODE ANN. § 573.024(a) (West 2004) (characterizing
the relationship of affinity); TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(a)(1)-(3) (recognizing the conflict with having a
party that is related to the judge).
176. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(a).
177. TEX. R. APP. P. 16.3.
178. Compare Arnold v. State, 853 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (holding explicitly
that Rule 18a applies in criminal cases), and DeBlanc v. State, 799 S.W.2d 701, 705 (Tex. Crim. App.
1990) (holding implicitly that Rule 18a applies in criminal cases), with State ex re. Millsap v. Lozano,
692 S.W.2d 470, 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (noting Rule 18a was adopted by order ofJune 10, 1980,
effective January 1, 1981, and later amended by order of December 15, 1983, effective April 1, 1984,
but observing "it is not clear that the rule applies to criminal cases"), and McClenan v. State,
661 S.W.2d 108, 110 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (concluding no procedure existed for recusal of
judges in criminal cases and calling for the legislature to pass statute modeled on Rule 18a).
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Judicial Disqualication and Recusal in Criminal Cases
Rule 18b of the Rules of Civil Procedure sets out the grounds for recusal
for both trial and appellate judges.' 9
A. Rule 18a-Procedure for Disquah/ication and Recusal in Trial Courts
Rule 18a sets out the procedure the parties and the court must follow
to file and dispose of a motion to disqualify or to recuse a judge. The
procedures for either type of motion are the same, except that the
deadline for filing a motion to recuse do not apply to motions to
disqualify; a motion to disqualify may not be dismissed for the failure of
a party to comply with the requirements for filing and service under
Rule 18a; the denial of a motion to disqualify may be reviewed by
mandamus as well as appeal.18 0
Generally, Rule 18a provides that if a party files a motion to recuse, the
challenged judge has the mandatory duty to either recuse herself or request
the presiding judge of the administrative district to assign another judge to
hear the motion.1"' The obvious purpose of the procedure is to avoid
even the appearance of impropriety by requiring the respondent judge to
step aside before ruling on the merits of a motion to recuse.182 Under
previous versions of the rule, the Texas Supreme Court declined to directly
address whether a challenged judge must either recuse herself or request
the appointment of another judge if a party files a defective petition,
while the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded, once a recusal motion has
been timely filed, a trial judge has no discretion whether to recuse or refer,
regardless of whether the motion properly pled prima facie grounds for
recusal.'84 The statute now specifically provides that "regardless of
179. TEx. R. CIV. P. 18b(b); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 16.2 ('The grounds for recusal of an
appellate court justice or judge are the same as those provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure.").
180. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(b)(2), g(3)(b), ()(2).
181. Id R 18a(b)(1)(A)-(B); see also McLeod v. Harris, 582 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Tex. 1979) (orig.
proceeding) (concluding once a proper motion is filed, the judge has mandatory duty to either recuse
himself or refer the matter to the presiding judge, also interpreting 18a predecessor and indicating if
the trial judge failed to comply, the supreme court would issue a writ of mandamus); In re Thompson,
330 S.W.3d 411, 418 (Tex. App.-Austin 2010, orig. proceeding) (showing once a proper Rule 18a
motion is filed, a judge has mandatory duty to either recuse himself or refer the matter to the
presiding judge).
182. See In re Norman, 191 S.W.3d 858, 861 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, orig.
proceeding) (stating, regardless of the grounds on which the judge's impartiality is challenged, the
proper response for a judge is to recuse himself or refer the motion to disqualify the judge to another
judge).
183. See Gonzalez v. Guilbot, 315 S.W.3d 533, 541 n.36 (Tex. 2010) (declining to address issue
of whether judge must refer defective recusal motion to administrative judge).
184. See De Leon v. Aguilar, 127 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (overruling McClenan and
stating "Rule 18a does not contemplate that a trial judge whose impartiality is questioned can
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whether the motion complies with the rule," a respondent judge must
recuse herself or refer the motion "within three business days after the
motion is filed," thus resolving the split.'"' A trial judge's error in failing
to recuse herself or refer a timely motion is subject to harmless error
analysis, however, where the record is sufficient to establish that the
grounds for recusal were meritless.'86
To avoid the disruption caused by filing a recusal motion on the eve of
trial, Rule 18a requires a party to file a recusal motion "as soon as
practicable after the movant knows of the grounds stated in the motion"
but in no event "after the tenth day before the day set for trial or other
hearing."'"' This ten-day requirement is not absolute where the movant
could not have known of the possible grounds for recusal until after the
motion would otherwise be untimely, as the statute provides the time limit
does not apply if the movant "neither knew nor reasonably should have
known" either that the judge whose recusal is sought would preside at the
nevertheless determine whether the allegations of bias against him state sufficient grounds for
recusal'); Villareal v. State, 348 S.W.3d 365, 370 (Tex. App.-Austin 2011) ("Even if the motion is
groundless, the trial court has no discretion to rule on the motion himself.'), pet. dism'd sub nom. as
untimey filed, In re Villareal, PD-1210-11, 2011 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1589 (Tex. Crim. App.
Nov. 16, 2011); see also In tr Norman, 191 S.W.3d at 861 ("Even though a motion to recuse may be
defective, the challenged judge must either recuse or refer the motion . .. ."); Amold, 853 S.W.2d
at 544-45 (concluding a defendant who filed an untimely motion to recuse waived an appellate
complaint that the trial judge did not properly refer the motion to an administrative judge).
185. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(f)(1).
186. See De Leon, 127 S.W.3d at 6 ("[A] trial judge's failure to comply with Rule 18a can be
harmless where the record demonstrates that a trial judge was not biased."); Mtdlenan, 661 S.W.2d
at 110-11 ("[B]ecause we find that the record before us is complete and that no bias is shown ... we
affirm the conviction and decision of the court of appeals."); see also Villarral, 348 S.W.3d at 370. But
see Mosley v. State, 141 S.W.3d 816, 837 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. refd) (concluding actions
taken by trial judge after motion to recuse filed are void); Crawford v. State, 807 S.W.2d 597, 598
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no pet.) ("Because the trial court neither granted the motion to recuse nor
referred the matter to the presiding judge, any other order made thereafter was void."); see also Davis
v. State, No. 10-07-00206-CR, 2008 WL 3845284, at *1 (Tex. App.-Waco Aug. 13, 2008, no pet.)
(per curiam) (not designated for publication) ("The proper remedy for a failure to comply with
Rule 18a is not reversal, but abatement and remand for purposes of compliance with the rule.");
Adames v. State, No. 01-94-01263-CR, 1999 WL 1174, at *1 (Tex. App.-El Paso Dec. 30, 1998, no
pet.) (per curiam) (not designated for publication) (abating the appeal and remanding the cause where
"the trial judge erred in failing to recuse himself or refer the motion for hearing to the administrative
judge"); Sanchez v. State, 926 S.W.2d 391, 396 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, pet. refd) (per curiam)
(holding the remedy for failure to comply with Rule 18a is abatement and remand to comply with
rule).
187. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(b)(1); see Martin v. State, 876 S.W.2d 396, 397 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1994, no pet.) (explaining the purpose of the ten-day rule); see also DeBlanc v. State,
799 S.W.2d 701, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (observing the ten-day rule serves to prevent litigants
from halting the proceedings "at will" simply by filing motion to recuse).
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trial or hearing or that the ground stated in the motion existed.'8 8
As noted, this time limit does not apply to motions to disqualify. Under
the rule, motions to disqualify must be filed "as soon as practicable after
the movant knows of the ground stated in the motion.""' The specific
exception under Rule 18a(g)(3)(B) that a motion to disqualify "may not be
denied on the ground that it was not filed or served in compliance with"
Rule 18a appears to call into question even this broad requirement,
however.'90
Both motions to disqualify and motions to recuse must be verified;
must assert one or more grounds for disqualification or recusal listed in
Rule 18b; and must not be based "solely on the judge's rulings in the
case."1'9 A motion must also state with "detail and particularity" facts
within the affiant's "personal knowledge," or upon information and belief
"if the basis for that belief is specifically stated," would be admissible, and
"if proven," would be sufficient to justify recusal or disqualification."" 
92
A motion that is not verified or sworn to will not trigger the provisions of
the rule.' 9 3
188. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) ("A motion to recuse ... must not be filed after the
tenth day before the date set for trial or other hearing unless, before that day, the movant neither
knew nor reasonably should have known . . . that the judge whose recusal is sought would preside at
the trial or hearing[,] or ... that the ground in the motion existed."); see also Villareal, 348 S.W.3d
at 369 n.2 ("Rule 18a does not account for the situation where the alleged ground for recusal could
not have been known prior to ten days before trial."); Harris v. State, 160 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex.
App.-Waco 2005) ("[I]f the basis for recusal does not become apparent until later, then the
defendant preserves the complaint by promptly filing the motion when the basis for recusal comes to
light."), pet. struck sub nom. for non-compliance with written order, In re Harris, PD-0408-05, 2005 Tex. Crim.
App. LEXIS 1457 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Rosas v. State, 76 S.W.3d 771, 774 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) ("[If appellant did not know the grounds for recusal before ten days of the
trial date, Rule 18a did not bar consideration of his complaint."); Stafford v. State, 948 S.W.2d 921,
925 n.6 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, pet. refd) ("The ten-day requirement of Rule 18a is not
absolute and does not contemplate a situation in which a party cannot know the basis of the recusal
until after a motion for recusal is no longer timely."); Marfin, 876 S.W.2d at 397 ("Rule 18a does not
contemplate the situation in which a party cannot know the basis of recusal until after a motion for
recusal is no longer timely.").
189. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(b)(2).
190. Id. R. 18a(g)(3)(B).
191. Id. R. 18a(a)(1)-(3).
192. Id. R. 18a(a)(4)(A)-(C).
193. See Kennedy v. Tex. Court of Criminal Appeals, 336 S.W.3d 382, 384 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 2011, pet. denied) (stating "[t]he procedural requisites for recusal in Rule 18a(a) are
mandatory, and a party who fails to conform waives his right to complain of a judge's failure to
recuse himself" and holding the judge who failed to refer a case did not err because the motion was
not verified); see also Moorhead v. State, 972 S.W.2d 93, 95 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet.)
('We find that the judge did not err in overruling the facially invalid motion for recusal in this
instance."); Vargas v. State, 883 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, pet. ref'd)
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Rule 18a(d) further requires the party filing the motion to serve a copy
on every other party, "if possible" by the same method of service as the
method of filing. 1 4  Any parties in the case may, "but need not," file a
response.s95 The judge whose recusal is sought should not file a response
but should instead recuse himself or refer the motion to the presiding
judge."'9 6
As already observed, disqualification, recusal, or referral is mandatory;
though a failure to follow the correct procedure is generally not subject to
mandamus unless the movant establishes the judge must be disqualified or
recused as a matter of law,1' or the challenged judge refuses to take any
action at all. 98 A movant may, however, "notify" the regional presiding
judge of the failure of the respondent judge to comply, presumably so that
the presiding judge may take corrective action by assigning another judge
to preside'9 9 or by issuing interim or ancillary orders "as justice may
",200
require.
Regardless of whether the challenged judge signs and files an order of
disqualification or recusal or an order of referral, the judge must take no
further action in the case until the motion has been decided, if the motion
has been filed before evidence has been offered at the trial or hearing,
"except for good cause stated in writing or on the record."20 ' The rule
naturally does not address what might control if the original judge were to
issue an order "for good cause" that might conflict with an order by the
(concluding a trial judge did not err in failing to refer a motion where the motion was not verified); cf
Arnold v. State, 853 S.W.2d 543, 544-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (noting the defendant who filed an
untimely motion to recuse waived an appellate complaint that the trial judge did not properly refer
the motion to an administrative judge).
194. TEx. R. Civ. P. 18a(d); see also Exparte Sinegar, 324 S.W.3d 578, 582 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010) (noting presentment problems for pro se inmates in the former version of the rule but
declining to address them).
195. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(c)(1).
196. Id R. 18a(c)(2), (0(1).
197. Compare De Leon v. Aguilar, 127 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (holding mandamus
is proper where bias is established as a matter of law), with Woodard v. Eighth Court of Appeals,
991 S.W.2d 795, 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (indicating appellate courts "should not grant
mandamus relief to the complaining party on a recusal motion ... because the party has an adequate
remedy at law by way of appeal from the final judgment"), and In re Chavez, 130 S.W.3d 107, 114-16
(Tex. App.-El Paso 2003, orig. proceeding) (acknowledging Woodard controls but highlighting
weaknesses in the decision).
198. See In re Thompson, 330 S.W.3d 411, 418-19 (Tex. App.-Austin 2010, orig. proceeding)
(holding a petition for writ of mandamus was granted because of the refusal of a trial judge to rule on
the a motion to recuse).
199. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(g)(1).
200. Id. R. 18a(g)(4).
201. Id R 18a(f)(2)A).
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regional judge issued "as justice may require."
Though not required by the rule, it is "prudent" for the recused judge
and assigned judge not to communicate about the case.202
Communications concerning scheduling matters that do not rise to the
level of an "order," however, do not violate the rule.203  Furthermore, a
judge's order prohibiting ex parte communications and a subsequent show
cause order following a violation of the order do not violate the
prohibition against further action taken by the judge both because such
orders are within the inherent powers of the court and because they bear
no relation to the merits of the underlying case.204
If the motion to disqualify or recuse has been filed after evidence has
been introduced, the respondent judge may proceed, "subject to stay by
the regional presiding judge."205
Once the challenged judge refers the motion to the presiding judge, the
regional presiding judge may hear the motion herself or assign another
judge in the region to preside over the hearing.206 Should a party move to
recuse the presiding judge, the judge may still assign another judge to rule
on the original, referred motion, or may "sign and file with the clerk" an
order referring the second motion to the Chief justice for
consideration.207 The Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court may
assign a judge to hear the second motion and issue any order permitted by
Rule 18a or "pursuant to statute."208
The judge presiding over the motion to recuse-either the regional
presiding judge or a judge assigned by her-may summarily deny the
motion for noncompliance with Rule 18a without an oral hearing.20' The
order overruling the motion on the grounds of noncompliance must state
the "nature of the noncompliance."2 10 Even if the motion is corrected,
202. Mosley v. State, 141 S.W.3d 816, 833, 836 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. refd) (stating
"[o]nce a judge is recused or disqualified from a case, the prudent approach is for the recused judge
and the assigned judge to have no further communications with each other concerning any aspect of
the case," but finding Rule 18a was not violated where communications involved scheduling the case
for trial).
203. See id. (concluding the judge was not "tainted or biased" by virtue of conferring with a
colleague concerning the motion for continuance).
204. See In re Easton, 203 S.W.3d 438, 442-43 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, orig.
proceeding) (recognizing the judge's show cause order and order prohibiting ex parte
communications had no relation to the underlying guardianship case).
205. TEx. R. Civ. P. 18a(0(2)(B).
206. Id. R. 18a(g)(1).
207. Id.
208. Id. R. 18a(i).
209. Id. R. 18a(g)(3)(A).
210. Id.
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the motion will count for purposes of assaying whether a party has filed a
tertiary motion and may be sanctioned under the Civil Practice and
Remedies Code.211
The regional presiding judge or judge assigned to decide the motion
may issue interim or ancillary orders in the pending case "as justice may
require."212 The statute specifically provides that the rulings of the
regional presiding judge must be by written order.213  Curiously, the
statute says nothing about the rulings made by an assigned judge, but
presumably they, too, must be in written form.
If the judge presiding over the motion decides to conduct a hearing, it
must be set "as soon as practicable," and even may be heard "immediately
after it has been referred" to the regional presiding judge or an assigned
judge, provided all parties have been given notice.21 The judge may
conduct the hearing telephonically "on the record," and documents
submitted by facsimile or email, that are "otherwise admissible under the
rules of evidence," may be considered.215 The statute proscribes the
parties from using a discovery request or subpoena to conduct discovery
on the respondent judge, "except by order of the regional judge presiding
or the judge assigned to the case."216 The challenged judge may disregard
any discovery request or subpoena unless it is "accompanied" by the
proper order.2 17
While the rule specifies that the judge's decision after a hearing must be
by written order, it does not require the judge to provide an explanation of
his decision or to make findings of fact and conclusions of law.2 18 If the
motion is granted, the regional presiding judge must transfer the case to
another court or assign another judge to the case.2 19
If a recusal motion is ultimately denied by the presiding or assigned
judge, Rule 18a itself dictates that the denial may be reviewed "for abuse of
discretion on appeal from the final judgment."220 A reviewing court must
211. Id.; see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 30.016 (West 2007) (outlining the procedures
and penalties for filing a third motion to disqualify or recuse).
212. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(g)(4).
213. Id. R. 18a(g)(2).
214. Id. R. 18a(g)(6)(A)-(B).
215. Id. R. 18a(g)(6)(C).
216. Id. R. 18a(g)(5).
217. Id.
218. Id. R. 18a(g)(2),(7).
219. Id. R. 18a(g).
220. Id. R. 18a(j)(1)(A); see also GaaI v. State, 332 S.W.3d 448, 456 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ("An
appellate court should not reverse a recusal judge whose ruling on the motion was within the zone of
reasonable disagreement.").
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consider the "totality of the evidence and information elicited at the
recusal hearing to see if the record reveals sufficient evidence to support
the recusal judge's ruling that the trial judge was unbiased."2 2 ' If the
presiding or assigned judge grants the motion, the order "cannot be
reviewed by appeal, mandamus, or otherwise"22 2  Motions to disqualify, in
contrast, whether granted or denied, "may be reviewed by mandamus and
may be appealed in accordance with other law." 2 2 3
If, after notice and hearing, the judge who hears the disqualification or
recusal motion determines that the motion was either "groundless and
filed in bad faith for the purpose of harassment" or "clearly brought for
unnecessary delay and without sufficient cause," the judge may order the
party, or attorney who filed the motion, or both to pay the "reasonable"
attorney fees and expenses incurred by other parties.2 2 4
B. Rule 16.3-Procedurefor Recusal in Appellate Courts
Recusal of appellate justices and judges is controlled by Rule 16.3 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.2 2 5 In contrast to Rule 18a, Rule 16.3 does
not set any fixed deadline by which a motion for recusal must be filed.
Instead, the rule requires only that the motion be "promptly" filed "after
the party has reason to believe that the justice or judge should not
participate in deciding the case."2 26  Once a motion has been filed, but
221. Gaal, 332 S.W.3d at 456.
222. TEX. R. CIv. P. 18ao)(1)(B). The logic of the rule is obvious: If the motion is granted, and
another judge is substituted before trial, neither party is harmed by having an unbiased judge preside,
thus, review is unnecessary. If the motion is denied, it is reviewable, but only after a trial during
which the judge's potential bias may be tested. See Gaal, 332 S.W.3d at 456-57 ("[I]f the motion is
granted, it is not a reviewable motion, the way the rule is drafted, because what harm can come from
having a trial by a fair judge, even though it's not the fair judge you want. If it's granted, I mean if
the motion is granted, it's not reviewable. If it's denied, it is reviewable, but only on appeal from the
final judgment; not on an interlocutory basis." (quoting Appellant's Brief on the Merits at 8, Gaal v.
State, 332 S.W.3d 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (No. PD-0516-10)).
223. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(j)(2).
224. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(h). Compare Sommers v. Concepcion, 20 S.W.3d 27, 44-45 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (concluding the court erred in granting sanctions
against a party where the motion was filed "well in advance" of summary judgment hearing and, thus,
there was no showing that the motion was filed for purpose of delay and the party "asserted at least
one arguable ground for recusal'", with Enterprise-Laredo Assocs. v. Hachar's, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 822,
841 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied) (noting the fact that the defendants were aware of
the ground for recusal long before the motion was filed supported the judge's finding that the
motion was filed solely for purpose of delay).
225. TEX. R. APP. P. 16.3; Exparte Ellis, 275 S.W.3d 109, 115 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, no
pet.).
226. TEx. R. APP. P. 16.3(a); see also Exparte Ellis, 275 S.W.3d at 123-24 (indicating a motion to
recuse was presented after an appellate opinion was released was untimely, where movant was
118 ST. MARY'SJOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE &ETHics [Vol. 6:76
before any further proceedings are conducted, the challenged justice or
judge must either "remove" herself from participating in the case or certify
the matter to the entire court.2 2 7  Since the challenged justice is
specifically barred from sitting with the court to consider it, the motion
must be decided by the majority of the remaining judges sitting en
banc.2" An order of recusal under Rule 16.3 is not reviewable, but denial
of the recusal motion is.22 9  The rule does not address whether appeal
may be taken immediately after the motion is overruled or whether the
complaining party must wait until after the court decides the underlying
issues in the case and hands down its opinion on the merits.
V. CONCLUSION
Though the principle of a fair trial in a fair tribunal is itself a simple
proposition, ensuring an unbiased judge, and more importantly the
appearance of impartiality, is subject to a myriad of overlapping
constitutional provisions, statutes, and procedural rules. Parties to a case,
and the judge presiding over it, must be aware not only of any
circumstances that might threaten the trial's fairness but also the
constitutional, statutory, and procedural rules that control who may
preside.
generally aware of the grounds for recusal but failed to uncover the specifics until after the opinion
was handed down); McCullough v. Kitzman, 50 S.W.3d 87, 88 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, pet. denied)
(holding a motion to recuse may not be filed after an opinion has issued).
227. TEX. R. APP. P. 16.3(b); see also Cannon v. City of Hurst, 180 S.W.3d 600, 601 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (recognizing, following Rule 16.3(b), the challenged justices had
referred the motion to full court and had not participated in deciding the merits of the motion); F.S.
New Prods., Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc., 129 S.W.3d 594, 597 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003,
no pet.) (noting procedure and observing it is "the functional equivalent of the procedure for
disqualification or recusal of a trial judge under" Rule 18a); McCullough, 50 S.W.3d at 88
(acknowledging the justices followed Rule 16.3 and certified the question of recusal to be considered
by the whole court with each questioned justice being excluded in turn); Sears v. Olivarez, 28 S.W.3d
611, 615-16 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.) (referring to the aforementioned recusal
procedures).
228. TEX. R. APP. P. 16.3(b); see also Cannon, 180 S.W.3d at 601 (conveying how the motion to
recuse was decided on by a vote of the non-challenged justices en banc); ES. New Pmds., 129 S.W.3d
at 597 (explaining how the court decided the motion to disqualify by a vote of the residual justices
sitting en banc); McCullough, 50 S.W.3d at 88 (providing another example of the procedure for
appellate judges to consider a motion to recuse); Sears, 28 S.W.3d at 615-16 (recognizing the entire
court sat en banc and excluded one justice at a time to determine whether there was a reason to
question the impartiality of any of the justices based on their political affiliation).
229. Compare TEX. R. APP. P. 16.3(b) (omitting any mention of a review process for an order of
recusal in the "decision"), with id. R. 18a(f (noting the denial of a motion of recusal may be
reviewed).
